Rethinking Russian Influence Operations in the Age of Weaponized Visibility
Earlier this month, Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency and Lund University released Beyond Operation Doppelgänger, a 200-page deep dive into the capabilities of Russia’s Social Design Agency (SDA). While most public reporting has focused on the now-infamous mirror sites used to spread fake news, this report makes a clear case that those cloned websites were just one piece of a much broader, and more enduring, strategy.
According to the authors, SDA isn’t some freelance influence shop. It’s part of a well-funded, Kremlin-directed propaganda network that merges digital marketing tactics with political messaging, psychological ops, and elements of classic espionage. This ecosystem is not designed to convince people of a particular narrative. It’s built to persist, to stay present, and to dominate the conversation. Success isn’t measured by belief, it’s measured by visibility.
What the Report Really Tells Us
Doppelgänger was not the operation, it was a delivery method
Those cloned news sites? One tactic among many. The report makes it clear that SDA’s influence work goes far beyond any one campaign. Doppelgänger was part of a series of coordinated “counter-campaigns” aimed at Europe, Ukraine, the United States, and beyond.
SDA uses attention, not persuasion, to justify effectiveness
The goal isn’t to get people to agree, it’s to make sure Russian messaging shows up in the conversation. If a piece of content gets fact-checked, reported on, or criticized, that’s considered a win. The more visibility these campaigns get, the more SDA is rewarded by its Kremlin backers.
The leaks could have been deliberate
One of the more provocative angles in the report is the suggestion that some of the leaked SDA documents might have been released on purpose. Whether the goal was to overload researchers, build internal prestige, or tie up resources while new infrastructure was being built, the leak may have been a calculated move.
Narratives are interchangeable, presence is the goal
SDA isn’t wedded to any particular storyline. The messages are interchangeable. If a campaign, whether it’s a meme, a bot swarm, or a fake news drop, gets traction, it’s scaled up. If it doesn’t, it’s dropped. The point is to flood the zone, not to persuade.
Some Questions Worth Asking?
This report calls into question a lot of our assumptions about what influence operations are trying to do—and how we should be responding. A few questions that come to mind:
- If visibility is the goal, not the risk, how do defenders responsibly counter disinformation without amplifying it?
- Are we unintentionally helping adversaries by publicizing their operations too effectively?
- Where is the line between countering propaganda and participating in its feedback loop?
- Are our current frameworks designed to deal with long-term influence ecosystems or only isolated events?
- Are we seeing the emergence of a disinformation-industrial complex, where performance metrics and funding cycles shape how propaganda is created and sustained?
Beyond Operation Doppelgänger doesn’t just describe a disinformation campaign, it maps out a system that adapts, exploits visibility, and treats media attention, sanctions, and cyber takedowns as signals of progress.
It’s not about changing minds. It’s about owning space…
Link to full report here:https://mpf.se/psychological-defence-agency/publications/archive/2025-05-15-beyond-operation-doppelganger-a-capability-assessment-of-the-social-design-agency
The Security Brief 