On 15 September 2025, CyberNews reported that over 500 GB of internal data tied to China’s Great Firewall leaked via Geedge Networks. The files included source code, internal work logs, communications, Jira tickets, and system configurations.
The leak revealed that Geedge markets its surveillance and censorship technologies abroad. Confirmed export locations in the documents include Myanmar, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Kazakhstan. The materials suggest these are part of a broader push under China’s global influence strategies.
This exposure provides a rare look into how censorship is engineered and sold. It highlights the interaction of technical design, political objectives, and global ambition in digital control systems.
Summary: On 19 September 2025, three Russian MiG-31 fighters violated Estonian airspace near Vaindloo Island, remaining inside NATO territory for about twelve minutes before being intercepted by Italian F-35s deployed under NATOs Baltic Air Policing mission. The aircraft entered without flight plans, had their transponders off, and failed to communicate with air traffic control, prompting a rapid NATO response.
Estonia reported the jets penetrated up to five nautical miles into its territory. NATO officials framed the incident as another deliberate provocation, testing alliance readiness along the eastern flank. Reports indicate these MiG-31s were carrying Kinzhal hypersonic missiles during the incursion.
Analysis: Russia is deliberately testing the NATO alliance by sending strategic assets into allied territory to measure response times and resolve. Putin likely views NATOs restraint as an opportunity to exploit through unconventional warfare and hybrid tactics. These incidents are likely to also shape his perception of alliance weakness, influencing future decisions in possible future conflicts in the Baltics or APAC region.
Military raids and high-profile arrests make headlines, but they do not end the business of cartels. Mexican and South American trafficking organizations operate like multinational corporations: diversified revenue streams, global supply chains, and deep local recruitment pipelines. Long-term disruption will require a different approach. The US must pursue strategies that make the cartel business model financially unsustainable and logistically difficult. This means combining proven tactics with fresh ideas.
The points below are presented as broad concepts to help spark discussion, rather than full write-ups. Bullet points allow the ideas to be absorbed quickly, keep the focus on the main themes, and give room for others to share their perspectives or expand on them with their own insights.
Hit the Money
Cartels are profit-driven, so hitting their finances directly is one of the most effective tactics.
Sanctions: Use the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act and related tools to freeze assets and bar cartel associates from the global financial system.
AML enforcement: Monitor wire transfers, front companies, trade-based laundering, and crypto flows.
Asset forfeiture: Seize properties, accounts, and equipment tied to trafficking.
Gatekeeper accountability: Extend AML requirements to lawyers, accountants, and company formation agents who unintentionally aid laundering.
Cartels are resilient because they operate across multiple domains: finance, logistics, community, and technology. Disrupting one area temporarily hurts them; attacking all at once can slowly erode their power. The US can combine financial sanctions, supply chain disruption, legal pressure, recruitment prevention, and intelligence innovation into a long-term strategy. Success will not be a single decisive victory, but a steady squeeze that makes cartel operations unprofitable and unsustainable.
More than 3,200 union workers at Boeing’s fighter jet plants in the St. Louis area have rejected a new contract proposal, triggering a countdown to a possible strike starting 4 August. Boeing has attempted to downplay the risk, but the potential disruption carries broader consequences. These facilities support production of the F/A-18 Super Hornet, the T-7A Red Hawk, and the F-47 fighter; an aircraft tied to the Air Force’s next-generation air dominance (NGAD) strategy.
A group of union representatives gathered for a meeting, emphasizing solidarity amidst ongoing contract negotiations affecting Boeing workers.
Strategic Implications for the Defense Sector
Supply Chain Fragility: A strike at Boeing could create upstream delays across the defense industrial base (DIB). Shared suppliers supporting multiple prime contractors may face scheduling conflicts, part shortages, or capacity shifts. This poses a risk to Boeing defense peers, which rely on a consistent flow of components for time-sensitive programs.
Labor Risk as an Industry Pressure Point: If the union secures a stronger contract, it may prompt similar labor movements elsewhere. Contractors managing fixed-price defense contracts will feel the pressure most, particularly those already dealing with narrow profit margins and tight delivery schedules.
Program Disruption Risk: The F-47 serves as a key stepping stone in the NGAD program. Delays in its production could affect milestone evaluations, budget cycles, or capability delivery timelines. The disruption would not be isolated to Boeing but could affect program participants and government planning across the board.
Competitive Repositioning: Boeing’s internal friction may create opportunity for competitors. A significant delay or loss of government confidence in Boeing’s delivery could lead to reallocation of roles or funding toward other firms positioned to absorb new responsibilities.
Artist rendering of the advanced F-47 fighter aircraft, part of the Air Force’s next-generation air dominance strategy.
Analyst Comment
Labor disruption poses a broader risk to national defense planning. The tightly connected nature of the DIB means that even a localized strike can create delays across programs. High-priority efforts like NGAD, B-21, Sentinel, GPI, etc. operate on narrow timelines with little room for disruption. A breakdown at one contractor can ripple across the system and set capability development back.
This should trigger a serious conversation within the Department of Defense and across the DIB. Workforce continuity and human capital planning need to be prioritized at the same level as supply chain security and cybersecurity. The consequences of ignoring this risk are real.
In the wake of escalating tensions in the Middle East this past spring, Iranian state-sponsored hackers turned their focus toward a new frontier: US critical infrastructure.
From May through June 2025, cybersecurity telemetry revealed a 133% surge in Iran-attributed cyber activity targeting US industrial and operational technology (OT) environments. These campaigns hit transportation and manufacturing sectors, but energy and water infrastructure remain long-standing targets. While espionage remains a primary objective, the evidence increasingly suggests Iran is preparing for more overt disruption.
Strategic Escalation
Iran’s cyber posture has always mirrored its geopolitical environment. In Spring 2025, that meant responding to Israeli and US airstrikes with asymmetric cyber operations. Groups like APT33 (Elfin), APT34 (OilRig), and MuddyWater (Static Kitten) ramped up traditional espionage, while more aggressive actors like CyberAv3ngers and Fox Kitten (tied to recent Pay2Key.I2P ransomware operations) pursued OT-focused sabotage and ransomware deployment.
Iran’s messaging through pseudo-hacktivist fronts and deepening ties with ransomware operators clearly framed this activity as retaliation for “Western aggression.” That framing is part of a broader Iranian cyber doctrine that views critical infrastructure compromised as a form of coercion and deterrence.
In parallel with APT activity, pro-Iranian hacktivists ramped up operations against US defense and critical infrastructure sectors. Groups like “Mr. Hamza” claimed responsibility for defacing and leaking data tied to defense contractors, including Raytheon technologies (RTX), following US involvement in strikes against Iranian facilities. While attribution remains murky, these operations often mirror Iranian state objectives and timelines, suggesting coordination or at least ideological alignment. The targeting of US DIB entities serves Tehran’s broader goal of projecting reach and retaliation across both digital and strategic domains.
🚨 DDoS Alert 🚨
Mr Hamza claims to have targeted multiple websites
-RTX Corporation 🇺🇸 -Parsons Corporation 🇺🇸 -Kratos Defense and Security Solutions 🇺🇸 -CACI International Inc. 🇺🇸 -Ultra Group 🇬🇧 -Cobham 🇬🇧 -Serco Group plc 🇬🇧 -Elbit Systems 🇮🇱 -Israel Aerospace Industries 🇮🇱… pic.twitter.com/YGHB1tTPmt
Iran’s shift toward OT environments is the most significant development.
MuddyWater and APT33 continued to exfiltrate intellectual property from manufacturing and defense-adjacent industries.
CyberAv3ngers targeted water control systems and other ICS devices with their custom malware, IOControl, discovered embedded in US and allied OT environments.
Fox Kitten evolved into a ransomware-as-a-service operator with an 80% (up from 70%) profit-share for affiliates targeting the US or Israel.
Alongside collecting information, these actors are also establishing persistence. In many cases, backdoors were quietly planted and left dormant; signaling an intent for future activation should the need arise.
Actor
Affiliation
Focus
Objective
MuddyWater
MOIS
Aerospace & Defense, Utilities, Gov, Civil & NGOs
Espionage
APT33
IRGC
Aerospace & Defense, Energy, Gov, Healthcare
Espionage and Access
CyberAv3ngers
IRGC
Water, ICS, Finance
Disruption
Fox Kitten
Unkown
IT/OT Gateways
Ransomware-as-a-service
OilRig
MOIS
Finance, Gov
Credential Theft
Implications for the US DIB
Iran’s campaigns are displaying a willingness to target logistics, aerospace, and manufacturing suppliers that support US and Israeli defense sectors. The Defense Industrial Base (DIB) should expect more of this; not only from state-sponsored actors, but from criminal or hacktivist affiliates acting on behalf of Iran’s IRGC or MOIS cyber arms.
Some immediate implications:
DIB contractors should hunt for Iranian TTPs and malware like IOControl and DNSpionage.
OT segmentation, remote access policies, and endpoint hygiene are foundational.
Incident response (IR) planning must include scenario-based escalation modeling: what happens if the access Iran gains today becomes a wiper event tomorrow?
US Response: Shields Up
Initially, the federal response may have felt quieter than prior cyber alerts like those during the Ukraine conflict but the signals were still there.
On LinkedIn, Jen Easterly, former CISA Director, reactivated the Shields Up mantra within hours of US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Her post explicitly warned US critical infrastructure operators to expect:
Credential theft and phishing
ICS-specific malware
Wipers masquerading as ransomware
Propaganda-laced hacktivist campaigns
Easterly urged sectors to segment OT networks, patch internet-facing systems, enforce MFA, rehearse ICS isolation, and actively monitor ISAC channels.
The various critical infrastructure-related ISACs followed suit. And while no single campaign bannered over the response, the defense posture matched the moment.
Jen Easterly emphasizes the importance of cybersecurity vigilance for US critical infrastructure in response to recent Iranian cyber activities.
So What’s Next?
Iran’s recent activity represents a shift in focus, not necessarily a shift in capability. The targeting of OT environments and critical infrastructure may reflect aspirational doctrine as much as operational readiness. While there’s no conclusive evidence that Iranian actors have staged disruptive payloads in U.S. networks, the direction of their targeting and tooling, particularly the development of ICS and OT-specific malware, suggests a growing interest in operational disruption, and not just information gathering.
For the US defense and critical infrastructure communities, this creates a clear mandate to prepare for the next phase before it arrives.
Monitor beyond the perimeter: Iranian threat actors have historically gained access through default credentials, exposed devices, and lateral movements through flat networks.
Expect dual-use operations: Intelligence collection and pre-positioning are not mutually exclusive.
Reassess assumptions: Iranian groups are traditionally viewed as less sophisticated than Russian or Chinese APTs, but recent coordination and tooling suggest they’re evolving quickly.
In short, we’re seeing a doctrinal pivot. Iran is exploring offensive options in OT environments, and testing how far it can go without triggering escalation. This makes detection, attribution, and sector-wide coordination more important than ever.
This document is a strategic nonproliferation analysis modeled after the IAEA’s State Evaluation Report (SER) format. Developed as part of an academic project, it assesses a specific country’s nuclear capabilities, incentives for proliferation, and potential safeguards challenges. The goal is to simulate real-world intelligence analysis and offer policy-relevant insights on nuclear risk and verification needs.
Introduction
Turkey occupies a unique strategic position at the crossroads of Europe and the Middle East, neighboring several current or former weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-proliferating states. As a longstanding NATO member under the US nuclear umbrella, Turkey’s security has historically relied on alliance commitments, including the stationing of an estimated 50 US B61 nuclear bombs at Incirlik Air Base. At the same time, Turkey has pursued nuclear energy ambitions for several decades as part of its economic growth and energy security strategy. Turkey is a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State party in good standing under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has been public in its support of nonproliferation norms. Occasional remarks made by Turkey’s leadership, however, have raised concerns about its long-term intentions. This research paper will provide a comprehensive analysis of Turkey’s nuclear energy development. It will survey Turkey’s nuclear program and infrastructure, examine potential incentives and pathways for proliferation, identify indicators of any deviation from peaceful commitments, and review verification mechanisms. The goal is to synthesize current information and offer a policy-relevant assessment of the proliferation risks associated with Turkey, in line with international nonproliferation frameworks.
State Profile and Nuclear Program
Background and Nuclear History
Turkey’s interest in nuclear technology dates to the 1950s with plans for nuclear power formulated as early as 1970. During the Cold War, Turkey’s role as a NATO frontline state against the Soviet Union emphasized its strategic importance, but nuclear weapons were supplied by the US under NATO sharing agreements rather than developed internally. Turkey established the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) in 1982 to supervise nuclear research and development (R&D). In the following decades, Turkey made several attempts to launch nuclear power projects, but these early bids were canceled or delayed due to financial, regulatory, and political hurdles. It wasn’t until the 2010s that Turkey’s nuclear power ambitions gained some traction, showcasing a high-level political push to reduce heavy dependence on imported energy and to nurture economic growth.
Nuclear Facilities and Fuel Cycle
Turkey doesn’t yet operate any nuclear power reactors, but construction is underway. The country’s first nuclear power plant, at Akkuyu on the Mediterranean coast, is being built by Russian state-owned Rosatom under a build, own, operate (BOO) model. The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant will consist of four VVER-1200 pressurized water reactors (4,800 Mwe total) with construction beginning in 2018, and Unit 1 expected online in 2025, with the remaining units coming online through 2028. A second plant was planned at Sinop on the Black Sea coast in partnership with a French Japanese consortium, but a 2018 feasibility study deemed the project’s cost and schedule unfeasible under the original terms. Since then, Turkey has explored other potential partners for Sinop, including more talks with Russia in late-2022 to possibly construct four reactors there. A third site at Igneada has also been under discussion with Chinese firms offering to build reactors using US-derived technology.
Map highlighting key locations for Turkey’s nuclear power projects, including Akkuyu, Sinop, and Igneada.
Beyond power reactors, Turkey’s nuclear infrastructure includes research and training reactors. A small TRIGA Mark-II research reactor (250 kW) has operated at Istanbul Technical University (ITU) since 1979. Another research reactor, the 5 MW TR-2 at the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center near Istanbul, commissioned in 1981, was used for research and isotope production. The TR-2 originally ran on high-enriched uranium (HEU), but in 2009 was shut down to undergo conversion to low-enriched uranium (LEU) as part of nonproliferation efforts. The reactor’s HEU fuel was returned to the US in 2009, and Turkish authorities have since implemented safety upgrades; regulatory approval to restart TR-2 with LEU has been sought, with additional plans to resume operations to support research and isotope needs. These moves have eliminated weapons-grade HEU from Turkey, aligning with global minimization of civilian HEU. Aside from these reactors, Turkey doesn’t currently operate facilities for sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle processes like uranium enrichment or reprocessing, and it has no known capability to produce nuclear fuel indigenously. All fuel for future power reactors will be supplied through foreign partners (i.e., Rosatom for Akkuyu) under long-term contracts. The Akkuyu agreement includes a provision to establish a fuel fabrication plant in Turkey, which would enable local assembly of nuclear fuel, though the plant would still rely on important enriched uranium from Russia. Turkey has an estimated few thousand tonnes U of domestic uranium resources in central Anatolia; a modest supply. The Temrezli in-situ leach uranium mining project was explored by foreign firms, but the government revoked the licenses in 2018, stalling the project. In 2024, Turkey showed interest in securing uranium supply abroad, signing a cooperation pact with Niger to allow Turkish companies to explore Niger’s uranium mines. Turkish officials, including the foreign and energy ministers, visited Niger in mid-2024 seeking access to its high-grade uranium deposits. It’s these efforts that reflect Turkey’s desire to ensure fuel supply for its “nascent nuclear-power industry” and potentially to gain experience in the front end of the fuel cycle, though any moves toward indigenous enrichment remains a longer-term and scrutinized prospect (Sykes, P., Hoije, K., 2024).
Future Plans for Nuclear Energy
Looking forward, nuclear energy plays a central role in Turkish strategy to diversify its electricity mix and lessen dependence on imported natural gas and coal. The government’s current plans see three nuclear power plant sites in operation by the mid-20230s (Akkuyu, Sinop, and a third site) with a total of up to 12 reactor units (approx. 15 GWe capacity). As of December 2024, Akkuyu’s four units are under active construction with Rosatom financing and owning a majority stake. As for Sinop, Turkey has initially partnered with a Japanese French consortium (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Itochu, and EDF/Areva) to build ATMEA-1 reactors, but cost estimates ballooned (over $44 billion) leading to that consortium’s withdrawal in 2018. Turkey has since kept Sinop on the agenda, even courting Russia to take it over, but no final agreement has been reached. Meanwhile, China has emerged as a leading contender for the third Turkish plant with negotiations in mid-2023 involving Chinese state companies proposing to build reactors (possibly Hualong One designs) at Igneada in Thrace. A project like this might involve US-derived technology through China General Nuclear’s partnership with Western firms. The timeline for Sinop and Igneada projects remains uncertain as both depend on financing terms, technology selection, and Turkish political will to commit further resources. Still, President Erdogan has repeatedly affirmed Turkey’s intent to become a nuclear energy country, even stating an ambition for “three nuclear power plants by 2030” in public remarks. To build the necessary human capital, Turkey has sent forth hundreds of students abroad for nuclear engineering education. Since 2011, Rosatom has sponsored Turkish students at Russian universities to staff Akkuyu; as of 2025, dozens of Turkish graduates have earned nuclear engineering degrees in Russia and returned to work at the plant. Similar training initiatives exist with other partner countries, creating a pipeline of skilled personnel. While aimed at peaceful energy development, this growing base of nuclear expertise and infrastructure provides capabilities that could, under different political circumstances, be relevant to a weapons program. Later in the paper I will expand on dual use.
Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant: Turkey’s first and advanced nuclear facility, demonstrating the nation’s commitment to energy diversification and security.
Nuclear Regulatory Framework
Turkey has recently overhauled its nuclear regulatory system to meet international standards as it works through nuclear power. Historically, the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) functioned as both a promoter and regulator of nuclear activities. In July 2018, Turkey created an independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority, or Nukleer Duzenleme Kurumu (NDK), transferring most of TAEK’s regulatory and licensing duties to this new body. The NDK regulates nuclear power plant safety, security, and all fuel cycle-related activities, issuing licenses and conducting inspections in line with IAEA guidelines. TAEK’s role was reduced to managing radioactive waste and decommissioning issues, and in 2020 TAEK was further consolidated into the Turkey Energy, Nuclear and Mining Research Institute (TENMAK). TENMAK now acts as the national R&D organization for nuclear science, energy, and mineral resources, inheriting TAEK’s research institutes. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), chaired by a high-level official, oversees all nuclear activities and advises the government on policy. Some other relevant bodies include the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (which sets energy policy) and the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA), which handles electricity market licensing and would approve electric generation licenses for nuclear plants. Turkey has also updated its nuclear liability and safety laws in line with international conventions, being a signatory of the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability for nuclear damage. Regarding nuclear security, Turkey has welcomed international peer reviews. The IAEA conducted International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions in 2003 and 2021, which reviewed Turkey’s nuclear security regime. The 2021 mission noted Turkey’s adherence to IAEA nuclear security guidance and incorporation of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which Turkey ratified in 2015. Overall, Turkey’s regulatory framework is being strengthened to support the safe expansion of nuclear energy, with clear separation of promotion (TENMAK) and regulation (NDK) functions as per international best practices. The framework provides the basis for ensuring that Turkey’s nuclear activities stay under effective control and exclusively peaceful.
Nonproliferation Treaty Obligations and International Commitments
Turkey has a long-standing commitment to global nonproliferation regimes. It became a party to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1979 and implemented a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1981. Under these safeguards, all nuclear material and facilities in Turkey are subject to IAEA monitoring to verify they are not used for weapons. Turkey was an early adopter of the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP), signing it in 2000 and putting it into effect in 2001. The AP grants the IAEA expanded rights of access and information, allowing for inspections of undeclared sites and verification of the absence of clandestine nuclear operations. Turkey’s implementation of the AP has allowed the IAEA to reach a broader conclusion since 2012 that Turkey has no undeclared nuclear material activities present. This provides confidence in Turkey’s compliance with its nonproliferation obligations. In addition to the NPT, Turkey also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, pledging not to conduct nuclear explosion tests. Turkey is also a party to international initiatives aimed at preventing WMD proliferation. It has been a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) since 2000, and of the Zangger Committee since the 1990s. These memberships commit Turkey to implement strict controls on exports of nuclear and dual-use materials, making sure they are not diverted to weapons programs. Likewise, Turkey joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1997 to curb the spread of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMDs. As a chemical weapons possessor in the past, Turkey signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and completed the destruction of its limited chemical stockpile, and it adheres to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) while no known biological programs exist in the country. Maybe most importantly, Turkey, like all UN member states, is bound by UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires national laws to prevent non-state actors from acquiring NBC weapons. Turkey had welcomed Resolution 1540 and submitted multiple national reports on its implementation, detailing measures such as export controls, border security, and criminalization of proliferation activities. Although Turkey is not a member of any formal nuclear-weapon-free zone, it has voiced support in international forums for the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Turkey’s stance has been that all countries in its region (including Israel and Iran) should forego WMD, aligning with its broader advocacy for disarmament and a fair nonproliferation regime.
To summarize, Turkey’s official posture is firmly embedded in the global nonproliferation regime: it has comprehensive IAEA safeguards and an Additional Protocol in force, and it participates in all major export control and nonproliferation initiatives. These obligations form a strong legal barrier to diversion of its booming nuclear energy program for non-peaceful uses. However, in the next section we will look at regional security context and Turkey’s evolving strategic calculus could, under some conditions, create incentives to reconsider these commitments.
Proliferation Pathways
Strategic Incentives for Nuclear Weapons
Under existing conditions, Turkey does not actively seek nuclear weapons. That said, analysts have identified several scenarios in which Turkey’s incentives could shift toward proliferation. The most cited trigger is a nuclear-armed Iran. Turkey and Iran are regional rivals balancing each other’s influence; if Iran were to openly acquire nuclear weapons or become a threshold nuclear state, Turkey could feel a heightened security threat and pressure to respond accordingly. The prospect of a nuclear Iran has already spurred debates in Turkey’s strategic community about Turkey’s vulnerability and the reliability of external protection. While NATOs nuclear umbrella currently covers Turkey, President Erdogan has voiced doubts about its long-term credibility, questioning whether it is acceptable that others are free to have nuclear-tipped missiles while Turkey cannot. This sentiment suggests a perceived inequity in the nonproliferation order and a desire for greater strategic autonomy. If Turkey’s confidence in NATO security guarantees diminishes, their leaders might reassess the costs and benefits of an independent deterrent. Calls to remove US nuclear weapons from Incirlik have increased in recent years. If those weapons were removed without an adequate alternative security arrangement, Turkey could perceive a deterrence gap.
Regional dynamics beyond Iran also play into Turkey’s strategic calculus. Turkey borders Syria and is in proximity to Israel; one a former proliferation and the other an undeclared nuclear state. Erdogan has rhetorically pointed to Israel’s nuclear arsenal as an unfair threat in the region, although Israel’s weapons have existed for decades and are likely not the primary driver for Turkey today. More relevant are Turkey’s great-power neighbors: Russia’s aggressive posturing in Ukraine and Syria and its nuclear saber-rattling unsettle the security environment. Although Russia is a partner of Turkey’s energy projects, their geopolitical interests diverge in places like Syria, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea. A nuclear capability could be seen by some Turkish strategists as an equalizer to deter a nuclear-armed Russia or to assert Turkey’s leadership in a multipolar Middle East. Additionally, domestic and prestige factors could serve as incentives. Under Erdogan’s administration, Turkey as embraces a narrative of “New Turkey” and neo-Ottoman strategic independence. Possessing advanced technology or even nuclear weapons can be viewed as a status symbol of great power. Some proliferation theories suggest countries may pursue nuclear weapons partly to bolster national pride or international standing. Erdogan’s 2019 statement, “there is no developed nation in the world that doesn’t have them”, shows a misconception but also possibly a prestige-driven itch: he compared nuclear armament with being a developed, powerful nation, implying Turkey should not be left behind. Domestically, pursuing nuclear weapons might rally nationalist support by asserting Turkey’s sovereignty against Western double standards, although it would conflict with Turkey’s international commitments and likely invite sanctions or isolation that most Turkish citizens would deem unacceptable.
In weighing these incentives, it is important to note that Turkey’s powerful military and bureaucratic establishment have historically prioritized alignment with NATO and adherence to the NPT. For decades now, the Turkish General Staff and diplomats were staunch defenders of nonproliferation, partly to maintain NATO cohesion and EU accession prospects. Turkey’s civil-military balance, however, has shifted under Erdogan, with civilian nationalist and assertive leadership consolidating control. If the political leadership decided a nuclear deterrent was necessary for national survival or prestige, domestic opposition from the traditional secular elite or military might not be as decisive a constraint as in the past. Still, any such decision would be fraught with risk, potentially jeopardizing Turkey’s security ties and economy. Most analysts assess Turkey is unlikely to go nuclear unless the strategic environment changes drastically; for example, if Iran openly crosses the nuclear threshold or the NATO security guarantee erodes beyond repair. Even in those cases, Turkey may first pursue middle options like developing latent capability or a civilian fuel cycle that hedges toward weapons before outright weaponization.
Potential Proliferation Pathways
If Turkey were to seek nuclear weapons, how could it technically proceed given its current capabilities and constraints? One pathway could be the uranium enrichment route. Turkey has significant experience with nuclear materials at the reactor level but currently lacks enrichment facilities. However, Turkey has consistently asserted its “right to enrich” under the NPT for peaceful purposes. In a proliferation scenario, Turkey may invoke an energy security rationale to establish an indigenous uranium enrichment program seemingly to fuel future power reactors. This could begin overtly as a small pilot enrichment facility under safeguards. An indicator of such intent was Turkey’s pursuit of raw uranium sources like Niger. Acquiring uranium ore is only logical if you plan to fabricate fuel or enrich it domestically rather than relying on foreign supply. A suspiciously timed deal for large quantities of uranium or the import of enrichment-related technology would set off alarms. Were Turkey to secretly acquire or build centrifuges, it might leverage foreign expertise. There is historical precent for illicit procurement networks using Turkey as a transit point. An example would be components for Pakistan’s AQ Khan network passed through Turkish companies in the early 2000s. Turkey could potentially seek external assistance for a weapons effort from allies like Pakistan, which has an established nuclear arsenal. Speculation exists that Pakistan and Turkey, sharing strong defense ties, may cooperate if Turkey decided to proliferate. There is currently no public evidence of any Pakistani commitment to aid a Turkish nuclear weapons program, and Pakistan would face intense international backlash if it openly transferred such technology. More likely, Turkey may try to indigenously develop the pieces of a fuel cycle. For example, this could include a covert centrifuge R&D project hidden within its civil nuclear research institutes. Turkey’s well-educated nuclear engineers could form the backbone of a secret program, though designing efficient centrifuges or obtaining high-strength materials in secret would be a significant challenge under trade surveillance.
Another pathway is the plutonium route, but this appears less practical for Turkey. Turkey’s power reactors at Akkuyu are light-water reactors under IAEA safeguards. Any diversion of spent fuel for plutonium reprocessing would likely be detected, and Turkey lacks a reprocessing plant. The acquisition or construction of a clandestine reprocessing facility would be tough to conceal. Turkey also has no heavy water reactors which produce bomb-suitable plutonium more efficiently; if it suddenly announced plans for a research reactor of the type that could yield significant plutonium, that would raise red flags. A theoretical scenario could involve Turkey repurposing its research reactor activities: for example, producing small quantities of plutonium in the TR-2 reactor’s fuel, which is now LEU, not ideal for weapons-grade plutonium production, and the reactor is small. This is an unlikely route given safeguards scrutiny and low output. A more dramatic approach would be for Turkey to obtain a complete weapon or some fissile material from outside the country. While not likely, I cannot entirely dismiss scenarios like stealing or seizing the US B61 bombs at Incirlik in a crisis. Those bombs, however, are under US control with Permissive Action Links and would be rendered unusable if seized; such actions would also damage US-Turkey relations and bring about global censure. Alternatively, Turkey could try to buy a weapon or fissile material on the black market. This, too, is remote given today’s monitoring and the lack of any known willing seller aside from North Korea, which Turkey would be extremely unlikely to engage.
A more subtle proliferation strategy for Turkey might by a nuclear hedge; developing nuclear latency without overt weaponization. This could involve the buildup of all components short of the bomb. These components could be a domestic enrichment capability, a stockpile of LEU, advances in missile delivery systems, and even civil nuclear naval propulsion research which could act as a loophole to withdraw material from safeguards as it uses highly enriched fuel. Turkey has already been building up its ballistic missile program, including the production of the Bora-1 (280km short-range ballistic missile (SRBM)), testing of the Tayfun missile (over 500km) in 2022, and plans to extend this to 1,000 km. While officially for conventional deterrence, such longer-range missiles could be adapted to deliver nuclear warheads in the future. Turkey’s pathway to a bomb, if it ever chose to pursue one, would likely begin with leveraging its civil nuclear program to acquire enrichment technology under seemingly legal pretenses, or less likely, turning to covert external procurement. Each path faces significant technical and political obstacles and would probably be detected before yielding a proper weapon. I will expand on this further in the next section.
Official animation depicting Turkish Bora-1 ballistic missile being fired from a mobile launcher.
Indicators and Verification Mechanisms
With Turkey’s extensive treaty commitments, any move toward nuclear weapons development would generate observable indicators detectable by international monitors or intelligence. Potential indicators of deviation from peaceful use include both changes in policy behavior and technical anomalies:
Policy and legal indicators: An obvious indicator would be if Turkey’s government openly signaled intent to leave or undermine its nonproliferation obligations. For example, withdrawing from the NPT or the IAEA Safeguards Agreement would be an unmistakable warning and an escalatory step. Short of withdrawal, Turkey could cease implementation of the AP or refuse IAEA inspections that it previously accepted, on grounds of sovereignty or reciprocity. Such behavior would strongly suggest clandestine activity. Heightened nationalist rhetoric, like repeated presidential statements about the right to nuclear weapons or hints that Turkey might need its own deterrent if regional threats grow, would reinforce concerns. While Erdogan’s past remarks were one instance, a continuing pattern of such statements or inclusion of nuclear options in doctrinal discussions would indicate a policy shift.
Undeclared facilities and/or activities: On the more technical side, the emergence of any undeclared nuclear facility would be a red flag. Under the AP, Turkey must declare any new nuclear-related site. Discovery (through satellite imagery or other intelligence gathering methods) of a suspicious installation could indicate a secret enrichment plant. Additionally, construction of unusual scientific facilities like a heavy water production plant or a large radiochemistry lab that could handle plutonium with no clear civilian justification would raise alarms. Turkey’s extensive territory and tunneling expertise mean a covert site is not impossible, but it would be challenging to operate such a facility without detection in the long term, given overhead surveillance and the need to procure specialized equipment internationally. Analysts would scrutinize high-resolution satellite images for telltale signs such as security perimeters, ventilation stacks, waste streams at research sites, etc.
Procurement anomalies: A more subtle sign of proliferation intent could be illicit procurement. If Turkish entities start seeking unusual dual-use materials or technology inconsistent with their known civilian programs, this would be a key indicator. Examples could include attempts to purchase high strength maraging steel, frequency converters, vacuum pumps, or ring magnets suitable for gas centrifuges, outside of normal channels. Turkey’s membership in NSG means it has pledged export controls, but procuring imports for itself may involve covert channels.
Scientific and technical publications: Clues often emerge from the scientific community. If Turkish nuclear scientists begin publishing research on enrichment techniques, laser isotope separation, high-temperature plutonium chemistry, or warhead design physics, it might indicate state encouragement of expertise in weapons-relevant areas. Open-source analysts monitor publications and patent filings for such patterns. A historical parallel is how Iranian scientists’ papers on neutron initiators and uranium metallurgy were early giveaways of weapons-relevant R&D. For Turkey, any sudden surge in advanced nuclear fuel cycle research beyond what is needed for power reactor operation would be notable. The Turkish government’s tight control over research institutions might limit open publishing, but international collaborations or conference presentations could inadvertently reveal new focus areas.
Other behavioral signs: Turkey might seek to harden or diversify its delivery systems as a precursor. Testing of longer-range missiles or developing indigenous satellite launch vehicles could be dual-use for nuclear delivery. Turkey’s pursuit of air and missile defense could also be seen as an effort to protect against Israel/Iran missiles in a world where nuclear deterrence factors in. While not a concrete indicator of proliferation, a heavy emphasis on ballistic missile capability combined with nuclear rhetoric would deepen suspicion.
To detect and respond to these indicators, the international community relies on a suite of verification systems and monitoring approaches. These include:
IAEA safeguards and the AP: If Turkey remains under its current agreements, the IAEA is the first line of defense. The IAEA conducts regular inspections at declared facilities to verify that no nuclear material is diverted. Inventory checks and surveillance ensure that all enriched uranium and spent fuel is accounted for. Under the AP, the IAEA can request complementary access to any site, even non-nuclear sites, to investigate indications of nuclear related activities. As an example, inspectors can visit a university lab or industrial facility on short notice if they suspect nuclear material might be present. They may also carry out environmental sampling, swiping surfaces and air for traces of nuclear isotopes that might indicate clandestine work. Turkey’s broad cooperation has so far meant the IAEA has not reported any irregularities. If evidence arose, like foreign intelligence tips about a hidden lab, the IAEA could invoke a special inspection to clarify the situation, though this requires Board of Governors approval if the state resists.
National and allied intelligence: NATO allies, particularly the US, maintain intelligence efforts regarding Turkey’s strategic programs. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) could pick up conversations or orders related to secret nuclear activities. For example, communication with foreign suppliers about sensitive equipment or unusual military orders to prepare tunnels could be intercepted. Throughout the Iranian nuclear crisis, Western intelligence often uncovered facilities before the IAEA was informed. A similar watch on Turkey would likely reveal early moves toward weaponization. Turkey’s integration in Western defense networks might make covert activities harder to hide from its allies. If such intel were obtained, allies would most likely approach Turkey privately at first, and if concerns continued, raise the issue at the IAEA Board or UN Security Council.
Open-source and non-governmental monitoring: In today’s information age, independent researchers and NGOs play an important role. High-resolution commercial satellite imagery is readily available; think tanks like the Institute for Science and International Security or Turkey’s own EDAM could analyze new construction. If a large building pops up at the Kucukcekmece Nuclear Research Center, for example, with no declared purpose, analysts will likely flag it. Turkey’s media and academia may also leak information if scientists are reassigned to secret projects or if there’s an unexplained budget surge for a strategic program. Despite political pressures, Turkey maintains a varied press environment where some investigative journalists continue to pursue sensitive military stories, unless national security laws silence them.
International legal systems: If clear evidence of a proliferation attempt emerged, the issue would likely escalate to the UN Security Council (USNC) to authorize stronger verification or enforcement. The IAEA could refer Turkey to the UNSC for non-compliance, as it did with Iran in 2006, if Turkey were found breaching safeguards. The UNSC could then mandate more aggressive inspections or demand Turkey halt certain activities. In extreme cases, sanctions could be imposed to dissuade further progress. One tool could be a bespoke monitoring mechanism like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) model used for Iran, involving extensive verification beyond the AP like continuous monitoring of centrifuge production. Reaching that stage, however, would indicate a severe breakdown of trust. Before it escalates that far, Turkey’s partners would likely exercise diplomatic pressure and offer incentives to keep Turkey within the nonproliferation fold.
There have been no signs to date that Turkey has undertaken any covert nuclear weapons-related work. The IAEA has continuously drawn the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Turkey remains in peaceful use. Turkish transparency reinforces confidence in its compliance. That said, maintaining vigilance is prudent. The verification systems described ensure that if Turkey did ever pivot toward proliferation, it would most certainly face early detection and international intervention long before actual weaponization. This alone serves as a strong deterrent against any covert programs.
Conclusion
Turkey’s nuclear trajectory truly epitomizes the dual-use dilemma at the core of the nonproliferation regime where a country is pursuing a legitimate nuclear energy program while navigating a volatile security environment and harboring great power aspirations. My analysis finds that Turkey’s proliferation risk, at present, remains low as the country is deeply embedded in treaties like the NPT and relies on NATO security guarantees, giving it strong incentives to abstain from nuclear weapons. Turkey’s nuclear energy program is under strict international oversight, and recent steps show its commitment to purely peaceful use. Turkey’s unique regional posture, however, means its strategic calculus may change if the balance erodes. President Erdogan’s hits at the unfairness of the current order seems to suggest that Turkish restraint should not be taken for granted if proliferation cascades begin in the region.
From a policy perspective, a few measures can aid in keeping Turkey’s proliferation risk in check. First, sustaining NATOs assurances to Turkey is important since clear commitments and missile defense cooperation can mitigate the country’s security fears that might otherwise spur a nuclear option. The continued presence of NATO nuclear sharing serves as a material reminder that Turkey is protected, and allies should quietly engage Ankara on the role these weapons play and conditions under which their removal would be considered. Second, the international community should support Turkey’s civil nuclear program in such a way that minimizes proliferation-prone capabilities. This can include offering fuel supply guarantees, so Turkey feels no need to enrich uranium, and assisting with spent fuel management. Negotiating a fuel take-back agreement for Akkuyu’s spent fuel, for example, would remove stockpiles of plutonium-bearing material from Turkey. Additionally, encouraging Turkey to source fuel through multilateral frameworks or international fuel banks would reinforce the norm against national enrichment.
Third, robust diplomacy with Turkey regarding regional threats can address the root motivators. If Iran’s nuclear impasse worsens, involving Turkey in solutions will be important so that Turkey feels its security concerns are heard and managed collectively rather than having to fend for itself. Turkey has, in the past, played a role in diplomatic efforts, for instance, the 2010 Tehran fuel swap initiative with Brazil. Reintegrating Turkey as a constructive partner in nonproliferation initiatives, rather than a potential adversary, is the smarter play. Domestically, Turkey could be encouraged to continue demonstrating leadership in nonproliferation by ratifying the CTBT and actively participating in proposals for a Middle East WMD-Free Zone. These steps would bolster Turkey’s international image as a responsible stakeholder, countering any domestic narrative that might favor a weapons path.
Finally, the international community needs to maintain vigilant monitoring of Turkish nuclear activities, but in such a way as not to alienate or unjustly accuse. The existing verification tools are adequate, but should Turkey’s behavior change, then preemptive diplomacy is needed to address issues before mistrust spirals out of control. Open lines of communication between Turkish authorities and the IAEA will help clarify any technical questions, like informing the IAEA of any new nuclear research projects under AP declarations to avoid misconceptions.
To conclude, Turkey today presents a low proliferation risk and in many ways is a model of a non-nuclear-weapons state investing in nuclear power under proper safeguards. Its domestic regulatory reforms and international cooperation on nuclear security are positive indicators. The risk profile is not static, and it depends on geopolitical developments. The evolution of Iran’s nuclear program, the status of Turkey’s relations with the West, and the internal political shifts will all affect Turkey’s strategic choices. Proliferation in Turkey is not inevitable, nor is it likely in the near term, but it is conditional. By understanding those conditions and reinforcing the barriers, the international community can ensure that Turkey continues to find that the benefits of nonproliferation outweigh any perceived gains of developing a nuclear weapon. Keeping Turkey within the nonproliferation regime strengthens regional stability and upholds the integrity of a global norm that, as President Erdogan himself argued at the UN, should apply equally to all. In the end, Turkey’s case displays the importance of addressing the security and prestige concerns that drive proliferation, thereby preserving its role as a responsible actor in the pursuit of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
Jewell, J., & Ates, S. A. (n.d.). Introducing nuclear power in Turkey: A historic state strategy and future prospects. Energy Strategy Reviews. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2015.03.002
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2005). Nuclear nonproliferation: IAEA has strengthened its safeguards and nuclear security programs, but weaknesses need to be addressed (GAO-06-93). https://www.gao.gov/assets/a248101.html
On 13 June 2025, Israel launched a surprise air offensive against Iran, bombing a series of nuclear and military installations after alleging Tehran was on the verge of nuclear weapons capability. Over the next week, intense exchanges ensued: Iran’s IRGC retaliated with hundreds of rockets and drones targeting Israeli cities, while skirmishes flared across Syria and Lebanon via Iran-aligned militias. The conflict escalated dramatically on 21 June 2025 when US President Donald Trump announced Operation Midnight Hammer, a US air and missile strike against three of Iran’s most critical nuclear facilities. All three sites (Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan) were integral to Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle and their selection was evidence of a sweeping effort to cripple Iran’s ability to produce weapons-grade material.
Notably, both Fordow and Natanz were under IAEA safeguards at the time of the strikes, meaning they were monitored with cameras, periodic inspections, and seals under the terms of Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. While these facilities had enriched uranium up to 60%, they remained within the bounds of Iran’s NPT obligations, though deeply controversial.
Iran’s immediate response was militarily limited but symbolically charged. In the early hours of 23 June Tehran fired a volley of ballistic missiles at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the largest U.S. base in the Gulf. The attack was preceded by advance warning and ultimately caused no casualties, a fact President Trump pointed to in calling Iran’s response “weak”. Nevertheless, the message was clear: Iran meant to show it could strike American assets in the region. Simultaneously, Iran’s parliament convened an emergency session in which hardline lawmakers voted to authorize closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a move that, if implemented, would choke off 1/5 of global oil shipments. This vote was largely posturing but it demonstrated Iran’s leverage over global energy markets and signaled how far it might go if fighting continued.
By 24 June, intensive behind-the-scenes diplomacy, reportedly involving Oman, Russia, and China, yielded a fragile ceasefire. President Trump announced that Israel and Iran had agreed to pause hostilities, with Israel phasing out airstrikes and Iran halting missile fire. Israeli warplanes stood down later that day, ending ten days of open warfare. The truce, however, remained shaky. Within hours of the ceasefire taking effect, Iranian proxies in Gaza and Lebanon launched isolated rocket salvos, and an Iranian missile strike landed in the Israeli city of Beersheba, causing civilian casualties.
For Iran, the outcome was bittersweet. On one hand, they survived the most concerted US-Israeli military action against it in decades; Iran’s leadership even declared victory once the ceasefire held, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei boasting that Iran had “slapped the US in the face” by resisting its demands. On the other hand, the physical damage to Iran’s nuclear program was significant. Post-strike satellite imagery showed heavily damaged buildings at Natanz and Fordow, and Western intelligence assessed that Iran’s enrichment capability had been set back by at least a year or two. US officials characterized the strikes as successful in destroying key infrastructure, while also emphasizing that no strike can destroy the knowledge in Iranian scientists’ heads. As the dust settled, Washington dispatched envoys to rally international support for stricter containment of Iran’s nuclear activities, even as Tehran dug in on its right to peaceful nuclear technology. This set the stage for the strategic implications now unfolding in the region, particularly regarding China’s role and the reactions of Iran’s regional rivals.
Strategic Insights
The US strikes jeopardize China’s investments in Iran and undercut Beijing’s role as regional mediator. While China condemned the attacks, it continues backing Iran economically an diplomatically. Beijing is expected to avoid direct confrontation while reinforcing ties to Tehran via energy trade, technology transfer, and coordinated diplomatic resistance to US pressure.
Satellite image depicting damage to Iran’s nuclear facility following recent US airstrikes.
Iran’s nuclear know-how and stockpiles remain intact despite facility damage. If Tehran resumes covert nuclear work, regional rivals like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt may accelerate nuclear “hedging” via civilian programs and dual-use technologies. The strikes risk triggering a latent arms race.
Attacking safeguarding facilities raises global legal and strategic concerns. Iran could reduce IAEA cooperation or even withdraw from the NPT. Regional states now question the value of treaty compliance if it doesn’t shield them from military action.
The crisis pulls Beijing and Moscow closer to Tehran. Both shielded Iran at the IAEA and could deepen covert cooperation in military tech and trade. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ambitions in the region are now tethered to Iran’s resilience and regional stability.
A detailed map illustrating China’s Belt and Road Initiative, showcasing the global infrastructure network involving railroads, ports, and pipelines.
The strikes boost US-Israel deterrence credibility in the short term, but also embolden Iran’s asymmetric response (ie proxy militias, cyber threats, and maritime disruptions). Gulf states remain diplomatically cautious but are reinforcing ties with U.S. defense structures
Watchlist: Things to Monitor
Indicator
What It Signals
Iran reduces IAEA access (ie expels inspectors or disables cameras)
A move toward clandestine nuclear activity or NPT withdrawal
Saudi or Turkish announcements on enrichment or reactor projects
Strategic hedging or quiet proliferation intent
Chinese tech transfers or sanctions-evasion trade with Iran
Strengthened Iran-China alignment despite Western pressure
Strait of Hormuz naval activity or proxy mobilization
Iranian asymmetric retaliation and escalation risk
Gulf states request new US air/missile defense assets
Deepening military alignment amid regional insecurity
Analyst Comment
From an intelligence perspective, the June 2025 Iran strikes represent a watershed that will reverberate through Middle East geopolitics in the short and mid term. The operation achieved a tactical objective in damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but it also unleashed a cascade of second-order effects. Chief among them is a likely redoubling of Iran’s determination to obtain a credible deterrent, nuclear or otherwise, to guard against regime-threatening strikes in the future. In turn, this is catalyzing reactions among Iran’s rivals to hedge their bets, potentially ushering the region into a new phase of latent proliferation.
The role of great powers has been pretty illuminating. China’s response, in particular, shows the primacy of interests over ideology in its foreign policy. Beijing’s vocal condemnation of US aggression was expected, but more telling is what China does next. So far, China appears committed to quietly propping up Iran’s economy and defense industrial base to ensure Tehran remains a thorn in Washington’s side and a viable participant in China’s Eurasian economic plans while carefully avoiding overt confrontation with the US or alienation of the Gulf states. This dual-track approach will test China’s diplomatic agility and will be a turning point in its Middle East footprint. Either China will emerge as a more assertive power brokering outcomes in regional conflicts, or it will retreat to the sidelines if costs outweigh gains. Early indicators (evacuation of Chinese nationals and calls for talks) seem to suggest a preference for limiting exposure, but Beijing is certainly learning from this crisis and will adjust its long-term strategy (for example, accelerating efforts to settle oil trades in yuan to reduce vulnerability to US sanctions pressure, as hinted by its increased use of RMB in dealings with Iran).
For the United States and its allies, the near-term requirement is to manage escalation and prevent Iran’s retaliation from sparking a broader war. This will mean hardening bases, improving regional early warning systems and processes, and coordinating closely with partners on contingency responses. Diplomatically, it will be imperative to capitalize on the leverage gained over Iran. If Iran is more isolated or its program set back, now is the time to negotiate firmer limits or at least interim arrangements to remove the most dangerous materials from its soil. The US Special Envoy has already signaled openness to talks focusing on Iran’s enrichment levels and stockpile, which would be a face-saving way for Iran to step back from the nuclear brink in exchange for sanctions relief once it regroups. Whether Iran’s leadership feeling humiliated is willing to engage is uncertain, but the ceasefire offers a narrow window for diplomacy before hardliners on all sides gain the upper hand.
A final note on non-proliferation: the integrity of the global regime is arguably at its most vulnerable point since the North Korean withdrawals of the early 2000s. If the Middle East heads into a proliferation cascade, the credibility of the NPT will suffer worldwide. To counter this, innovative solutions should be pursued. These would include a US-led initiative for a Middle East security guarantee (a nuclear umbrella covering Israel and key Arab states to negate their need for independent arsenals), or a rejuvenated push for regional disarmament talks that include Israel’s capabilities, a topic long taboo but maybe less so in the face of multiple potential nuclear actors emerging.
For intelligence terms, we will be watching for the morning after indicators: Does Iran move materiel to secret sites? Do Saudi Arabia or Turkey suddenly announce new “research” reactors or mining projects? Do China and Russia sign new defense deals with Iran? Each of these will tell us how far the dominoes could fall. As of now, the short-term implications are clear: heightened tensions, hedging, and alignment shifts. The mid-term implications, whether this results in a fundamentally more nuclearized and polarized Middle East, or a sobered return to the negotiating table, will depend on the deftness of diplomacy in the weeks ahead and the willingness of regional actors to step back from the precipice.
Stay tuned for more in-depth analysis on Chinese strategic influence in the Middle East, regional nuclear hedging, diplomatic alignments, and regional deterrence dynamics in a writeup to come.
In the early hours of 13 June 2025, Israel launched its most significant direct assault on Iran in modern history. Codenamed Operation Rising Lion, the campaign marked a sharp turn in the long-running covert conflict between the two states. Israeli fighter jets struck over 100 targets across Iranian territory, including the nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz, missile depots in Kermanshah, and command nodes in Tehran. Multiple senior Iranian commanders and nuclear scientists were reportedly killed. The operation is a dramatic escalation in regional tensions, with serious implications for Middle East stability and global nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
Striking the Core
Israel’s operation was expansive and precise. It targeted critical military infrastructure and nuclear development facilities, including hardened underground sites. Among the dead are reported high-ranking IRGC figures and prominent nuclear experts like Hossein Salami, Ali Shamkhani, and Mohammad Bagheri, a dual strategy of infrastructure disruption and leadership decapitation.
Key Iranian military and political figures following the Israeli strikes during Operation Rising Lion.
The strikes hit deep into Iran, including Tehran itself, a rare and provocative step. Civilian areas adjacent to some targets were also impacted, compounding the psychological effect and raising the stakes for potential retaliation.
Map detailing the locations of Israeli airstrikes in Iran on June 13, 2025, highlighting key targets including Tehran and Kermanshah.
Iran’s Response
Iran responded with over 100 drones launched toward Israel with most being intercepted. While less escalatory than a ballistic missile barrage, the drone response shows Iran’s intent to retaliate while avoiding immediate full-scale war. Tehran has declared the attack a “declaration of war” and vowed further action.
Iranian leaders are faced with a strategic dilemma. They must respond forcefully enough to maintain domestic and regional credibility but avoid a retaliation so severe that it draws Israel (and potentially the US) into a broader war. Whether Iran resorts to cyberattacks, asymmetric proxy warfare, or more direct missile retaliation remains to be seen.
Crowds gather in front of damaged residential buildings following the Israeli airstrikes in Tehran.
Regional Reverberations
This confrontation is already straining alliances and heightening regional volatility. Countries like Jordan and Iraq, whose airspace has been overflown by drones and missiles, find themselves increasingly entangled. Gulf states that recently normalized relations with Israel now face diplomatic whiplash, caught between their security partnerships and regional solidarity.
Oil prices have surged. International flight paths have shifted. And diplomatic channels, particularly around Iran’s nuclear program, have gone dark.
Most notably, this exchange shifts the regional deterrence calculus. Israel has shown it will not wait for diplomacy or rely on allies to neutralize existential threats. Iran, meanwhile, may reevaluate the value of nuclear ambiguity and instead pursue a more overt deterrent capability.
A Blow to Nonproliferation
The Israeli strikes have likely derailed any remaining diplomatic momentum around the Iran nuclear deal. Ongoing negotiations now appear suspended, and Iranian hardliners are almost certain to push for more aggressive nuclear development in response.
This crisis could have a ripple effect beyond Iran. Regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, long watching Iran’s trajectory with caution, may feel renewed pressure to pursue nuclear hedging strategies. If Tehran exits the NPT or halts IAEA inspections, it could trigger a broader crisis of confidence in the global nonproliferation regime.
The strategic irony here is that an operation intended on delaying or halting Iran’s nuclear progress may instead accelerate regional proliferation.
Aerial view of the Natanz Enrichment Complex in Iran, showing significant damage from Israeli airstrikes during Operation Rising Lion on June 13, 2025.
Strategic Outlook
Israel’s strikes have brought an enduring conflict into the open. Whether this confrontation stabilizes the region through deterrence or unleashes a cycle of retaliation depends on what comes next. For now, the situation remains volatile. What’s certain is that this event has reshaped the security landscape of the Middle East. The strike on Natanz seeks to redraw redline, testing thresholds, and redefining the future of deterrence in a region already teetering on the edge.
As Poland approached a critical presidential runoff on June 1, Russian-linked influence networks ramped up efforts to flood Polish social media with anti-Ukrainian messaging. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) recently published a detailed report showing how these campaigns are designed to erode public support for Ukraine and stir domestic resentment, right when political tensions are at their peak
Two main disinfo operations are behind this push. One is Operation Overload, which has a track record of impersonating media outlets and recycling content. The other is a newer ecosystem tied to the Pravda and Portal Kombat networks, which lean heavily on AI-generated articles and fake screenshots to manufacture outrage.
Some of the false claims spreading online included:
A fake story alleging that Ukrainian refugees were planning terror attacks in Poland
A re-edited satire video presented as real, suggesting Ukrainians were exploiting Poland’s welfare programs
AI-written content designed to look like legitimate Polish journalism
False narratives amplified so widely that even language models like ChatGPT ended up echoing them when prompted
Analyst Comments
This is classic information warfare, just modernized.
Russia doesn’t need to hack a system if it can hack the conversation. These campaigns are trying to fracture Poland’s support for Ukraine by painting refugees as a threat socially, economically, and even physically. It is low-cost, high-volume influence work, meant to stoke outrage, not debate.
What makes this different from past operations is how AI tools and platform vulnerabilities are baked into the tactics. Generative models are now being used to churn out disinfo content that mimics real reporting. Influencer accounts are being used to frame false stories as trending news. Even satire is weaponized, knowing that once something goes viral, the original context is often lost.
As we head into another global election cycle, Poland is not the only target. Similar tactics are already being seen elsewhere, especially in countries where refugee issues, defense policy, or migration tensions are front and center. This is a good reminder for policymakers, tech platforms, and threat analysts: the battlefield may be digital, but the consequences are real.
Disclaimer:This post is based on unclassified, open-source reporting and reflects my personal analysis and interpretations. The views expressed here are my own and do not represent the views or positions of my employer.
In a previous post, I detailed GRU Unit 29155’s role in physical sabotage campaigns across Europe, from the Skripal poisoning to the Czech arms depot blasts. For years, their operations reflected a legacy of Cold War-era tradecraft. Covert, kinetic, and plausibly deniable.
But according to a new investigation from The Insider, Unit 29155 has undergone a major transformation. While their physical sabotage capabilities remain intact, they have expanded into the cyber domain, developing a set of offensive capabilities that go far beyond what most attributed to this unit.
This evolution has implications not only for Ukraine but for NATO supply chains, digital infrastructure, and future hybrid conflicts.
Cyber Attacks
The reporting confirms what many in the threat intelligence space have suspected. Unit 29155 is no longer limited to physical acts of disruption. In 2022, the group ran the WhisperGate operation in Ukraine, using destructive malware to damage government systems and leak personal data. The intent was not just disruption. It was psychological destabilization.
This operation was structured and deliberate. The malware wiped systems while the data leaks created distrust. This fits Russia’s broader approach to hybrid warfare, where technical, cognitive, and physical effects are coordinated for maximum pressure.
Disinformation Campaigns
Unit 29155 also operated false flag personas like Anonymous Poland. These were used to publish disinformation that undermined trust between Ukraine and its Western partners. This was not unsophisticated trolling. It was part of a campaign using multilingual content and coordinated narratives.
In one example, the group reportedly collaborated with Bulgarian journalist Dilyana Gaytandzhieva to publish stolen material. This gave the operation a veneer of journalistic legitimacy. Russia has long used this kind of media laundering to amplify leaks, but seeing it connected to Unit 29155 shows their deeper involvement in the information space.
Hacker Recruitment
This evolution started more than a decade ago. Around 2012, the GRU began recruiting programmers and hackers through online forums and competition platforms. They focused on individuals who could operate quietly, build offensive tools, and maintain strong operational security.
Some of these actors developed malware, access frameworks, and data exfiltration tools that supported both espionage and sabotage. This is the convergence of cybercrime tradecraft and military doctrine. Unit 29155 has grown into a force that can operate in the digital domain with the same intent and effect as their physical missions.
NATO Supply Disruption
The investigation also highlights the unit’s interest in transportation and logistics networks, particularly in countries like Poland. This is a strategic move. It targets the rear areas that support Ukraine’s defense by interfering with how weapons and supplies reach the front lines.
Instead of blowing up rail lines, the modern version might involve tampering with scheduling software, triggering false alarms, or planting disruptive code that causes bottlenecks. The outcome is the same. Slow the response. Introduce uncertainty. Force decision makers to question the integrity of their support systems.
This aligns closely with Russian military thinking. Create friction, delay, and confusion through minimal but high impact actions.
Analyst Comments
This isn’t a new threat; it’s a mature one. GRU Unit 29155 has evolved from a physical sabotage unit into a hybrid operations group. Their capabilities now span cyber access, information warfare, and physical disruption. All under the same command structure.
For security professionals, this should change how we think about attribution and intent. A single unit may now be responsible for an email phishing campaign, a leaked set of government documents, and a compromised transportation system. That complicates response planning and forces a more integrated intelligence posture.
In my opinion, cyber sabotage is no longer the prelude to conflict. In many cases, it is the conflict.
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The Security Brief 