In late-December 2025, the Polish energy sector was targeted by a coordinated series of destructive cyberattacks using a new malware tracked as DynoWiper [1]. The operation affected over 30 renewable energy sites and a major combined heat and power plant during a period of extreme cold.
Key Technical Observations:
DynoWiper is a destructive tool designed to overwrite or delete data. It shares significant code overlaps with the “ZOV” wiper previously used in Ukraine [2].
The attack focused on the distributed edge, specifically targeting Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) at wind and solar farms. Attackers damaged firmware to disable remote communication with the grid operator.
In several instances, access was gained via internet-exposed edge devices lacking multi-factor authentication (MFA).
Attribution Discrepancy
A fairly uncommon disagreement exists between private industry and Polish officials regarding the actor:
Sandworm (GRU): Linked by ESET and Dragos due to technical malware lineage and the 10th anniversary of the 2015 Ukraine blackout [3].
Dragonfly/Berserk Bear (FSB): Formally attributed by CERT.PL based on specific C2 infrastructure overlaps with current FSB espionage operations [4].
The evidence suggests a collaborative model or shared contractor network. One agency likely provided the initial access/infrastructure while the other provided the specialized destructive tradecraft. The targeting of Polish critical infrastructure is a shift for FSB-aligned actors from long-term pre-positioning to active destruction against NATO critical infrastructure.
Venezuela has increasingly become a narco-state where high-level officials enable drug trafficking to sustain their power. US authorities accuse Nicolas Maduro and his inner circle (dubbed “Cartel of the Suns“) of colluding with criminals to ship cocaine abroad. While not a traditional cartel hierarchy, this term best reflects how the regime allows criminal networks to operate in exchange for loyalty and funds. The result of this is a steady flow of cocaine through Venezuelan territory from Colombian producers, using Venezuela’s porous borders and ports as the transit points. These illicit revenues help Caracas offset economic collapse under sanctions, propping up Maduro’s government when legitimate oil income fell. In turn, Venezuela’s instability and lawlessness (fueled by drug money, corruption, and mass migration) have regional spillover effects, straining neighboring countries and providing openings for foreign powers to step in as patrons and exploiters.
Cuba’s Lifeline and Intelligence Footprint
Cuba has arguably the most intimate stake in Venezuela’s survival. Since the era of Hugo Chavez, a Caracas-Havana axis has existed where Venezuela ships subsidized oil to Cuba, literally keeping Cuban lights on. Without the Venezuelan oil lifeline, Cuba’s economy would be unsustainable, a fact that cements Havana’s interest in shoring up Maduro. In exchange, Cuba provides extensive political and security assistance. Over the past two decades, thousands of Cuban personnel, including doctors, teachers, but also security and intelligence advisors, have been posted in Venezuela. They advise and embed within Venezuelan military units and intelligence services, imparting Cuba’s decades of know-how in surveillance, counterintelligence, and political repression. This Cuban contingent is widely seen as a pillar of Maduro’s regime stability, helping prevent military coups and monitoring potential dissent. In essence, Havana leverages Venezuela’s turmoil (and its own advisors on the ground) to maintain an allied government and extend Cuba’s influence in South America. The partnership is deeply symbolic: Venezuela supplies Cuba with energy and funds, and Cuba’s security apparatus works to keep Caracas in friendly hands, frustrating US attempts to isolate the Maduro regime.
Russia’s Military and Strategic Leverage
Russia has has also cultivated Venezuela as a strategic foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Since Hugo Chavez reached out to Moscow in 2000, Russia became a vital source of arms, oil investments, and diplomatic backing for Venezuela. Billions in weapon sales, from aircraft to air defense systems, and joint projects in oil fields ensued, not always yielding profit for Moscow but serving a geopolitical purpose. In return, the Kremlin gained a significant presence in South America, fulfilling Putin’s ambition to challenge the US in its own backyard. By propping up Caracas, Russia forces Washington to divert attention and resources, effectively acting as a spoiler to US interests. Even amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, Moscow has maintained military ties with Venezuela. In May 2025, the two signed a Strategic Partnership Treaty to expand cooperation in energy, mining, defense technology, and intelligence sharing. Russian oil firms also quietly supply Venezuela with crucial diluents to keep its heavy crude flowing. Furthermore, Russia and Venezuela regularly engage in military exchanges and joint exercises, where Venezuela even hosted segments of Russia’s International Army Games in 2022). In past crises, the Kremlin showed willingness to deploy assets like sending strategic bombers and air defense units to Venezuela during moments of heightened US pressure. All of this highlights how Moscow leverages Venezuela’s anti-US stance and need for security guarantees to deepen its footprint. From intelligence operatives on Venezuelan soil to warship visits, Russia uses Venezuela as a forward base of influence in LATAM, complicating US strategic calculus. Notably, both countries vocally oppose US “unilateral sanctions” and invoke principles of non-intervention, aligning themselves at the UN and other forums. In short, Venezuela’s turmoil and isolation have been a golden opportunity for Russia to project its power westward, cementing an alliance that counters US presence in the region.
China’s Economic Stakes in Venezuela
China’s approach centers on economic and technological entrenchment in Venezuela. Over the last 15 years, Beijing has loaned Venezuela over $50 billion in exchange for oil. Even as Venezuela’s oil industry deteriorated, China remained its major buyer, responsible for nearly 3/4 of Venezuela’s oil exports, often through intermediaries to evade sanctions. Much of this oil repays Chinese loans, and steep discounts give China’s refiners a bargain supply. Outside buying oil, Chinese state giants hold enormous stakes in Venezuela’s oil reserves. As the chart below shows, Sinopec and CNPC together claim rights to over 4.4 billion barrels of Venezuelan oil.
Figure 1: CN state firms Sinopec and CNPC hold the largest oil entitlements in VE, surpassing RU, US, and other foreign firms through joint ventures with PDVSA. Source: Morgan Stanley Research, Wood Mackenzie
These investments grant Beijing long-term influence over venezuela’s most prized asset. China has also expanded into infrastructure and high-tech realms: Huawei built Venezuela’s national telecom backbone, ZTE designed the controversial “Fatherland Card” ID and social control system, and China’s CEIEC helped set up surveillance networks. Such technology transfers embed Chinese systems deep into Venezuela’s governance and security apparatus. In effect, Venezuela has become an outpost for China’s Digital Silk Road and resource acquisition strategy. Beijing leverages Venezuela’s financial desperation to secure favorable deals in oil, minerals, and telecom, all while portraying itself as Venezuela’s dependable partner amid US sanctions. China’s presence yields geopolitical dividends too; it gains political goodwill across LATAM for standing by Venezuela, and it challenges US influence by offering an alternative development model. However, China treads carefully; it has at times slowed new loans or investments, wary of Venezuela’s instability and inability to repay. Still, with a recent agreement on promoting bilateral investments (signed May 2024) and high-profile state visits, Beijing signaled its commitment to deepening ties with Caracas for mutual strategic benefit.
Venezuela as a Platform for Extra-Regional Influence
For Cuba, Russia, and China, an embattle Venezuela serves as a gateway to project power in LATAM. Under Chavez and Maduro, Caracas spearheaded an alliance of leftist governments (the ALBA bloc) that resisted US policies. Venezuela once bankrolled regional clients with oil subsidies (i.e. PetroCaribe program), buying influence in the Caribbean and Central America. Today, even with resources diminished, Venezuela provides a friendly territory for US rivals to operate. Intelligence reports indicate that Russian and Iranian military personnel have used Venezuelan bases to cooperate on drone programs and other strategic projects. Meanwhile, Cuba uses Venezuela as a forward post for its intelligence network in South America, extending Havana’s reach beyond the island. By hosting foreign military advisors, allowing port calls, or brokering diplomatic support, Venezuela amplifies the global influence of its patrons. Caracas often votes with Beijing and Moscow at the UN, and in turn receives diplomatic cover; for example, joint opposition to US “unilateral sanctions” has been a refrain of Venezuela, China, and Russia alike. The Venezuelan regime also harbors Colombian guerrilla groups and traffickers, whose activities destabilize neighboring Colombia and beyond. Importantly, Venezuela’s mere alignment with great-power competitors transforms it into a symbolic beachhead, demonstrating that US dominance in the Western Hemisphere can be contested. This emboldens other populist or authoritarian leaders in LATAM who seek multi-polar alternatives. In summary, Venezuela’s drug-fueled instability and anti-US stance make it a convenient platform for Cuba’s ideological agenda, Russia’s military forays, and China’s economic inroads, extending these countries’ influence throughout South America under the cover of “South-South” cooperation.
US-Mexico Counter-Narcotics Efforts
Facing an unprecedented fentanyl overdose epidemic at home, the US has refocused on counter-narcotics cooperation with Mexico as a linchpin of its regional strategy. over 100k American die annually from drug overdoses, primarily fentanyl, putting intense pressure on Washington to act. Most illicit fentanyl is manufactured by Mexican cartels using Chinese-sourced precursor chemicals, then smuggled across the US-Mexico border. Yet until recently, Mexico was reluctant to confront the cartels head-on, even claiming Mexico does not produce fentanyl. Cooperative security programs like the Merida Initiative stagnated as Mexico scaled back US law enforcement presence and hollowed out joint anti-drug efforts. This approach gave transnational cartels free rein, worrying US officials. In late-2023, however, signs of a shift had emerged. Through intense diplomacy (and some hardball tactics like hinting at trade tariffs), the Biden administration got Mexico to acknowledge the crisis. Bilateral agreements were reached in late-2023. Around the same time, China agreed to re-engage in narcotics cooperation, promising to police chemical exports more rigorously after high-level talks.
Concrete actions followed these understandings. US pressure coincided with Mexico’s military capturing major cartel figures, most notably Ovidio Guzman (son of “El Chapo”), who was extradited to the US in September 2023 on fentanyl trafficking charges. The US Drug Enforcement Administration also helped Mexican forces target clandestine fentanyl labs, while joint operations at the border (like Operation Plaza Spike) ramped up inspections of vehicles for hidden drugs. By late-2024, under mounting US pressure, Mexico reportedly deployed thousands of troops to its northern border and stepped up seizures of fentanyl pills and precursor chemicals. This growing collaboration is reshaping narcotrafficking routes as land routes into Texas and Arizona toughen, cartels have begun exploring alternate corridors via sea and Central America. There is also evidence that traffickers are adapting by using new chemicals and dodging Chinese export curbs, a reminder that the narco-network is flexible and will seek the path of least resistance. Still, Washington’s message is that Mexico’s partnership is critical. Improved US-Mexico cooperation also serves as a counterweigh to extra-hemispheric actors: it shows that North America can tackle its own security problems, leaving less excuse for outside powers to meddle under the pretext of addressing lawlessness.
Implications for US National Security and Regional Stability
These developments carry far-reaching implications. US national security is directly challenged when hostile powers gain a foothold in the Americas under the guise of aiding a beleaguered Venezuela. The growing presence of Russian military advisors, Chinese tech infrastructure, and Cuban intelligence operatives in Venezuela undermines the traditional US sphere of influence and could threaten American assets or allies in the region. For example, Russia’s support to Venezuela is explicitly aimed at countering US influence in LATAM. Such encroachment harkens back to Cold War era concerns and has led US strategists to reassert the Monroe Doctrine logic of keeping external adversaries out of the hemisphere. Indeed, Venezuela’s alignment with Cuba, China, and Russia is cited in Washington as an unacceptable beachhead for “the United States’ main opponents” in its backyard. The illicit drug trade exacerbates this strategic contest. The Venezuelan regime’s role in narcotrafficking not only finances its own repression; it also exports instability northward (in the form of drugs and refugees) and tarnishes US credibility when the problem grows. American policymakers argue that failing to check Venezuela’s narco-network and its foreign sponsors would embolden other anti-US regimes and signal decline of US leadership.
On the other hand, a robust US counter-narcotics push, especially in partnership with Mexico, could alter the balance. Success in curbing fentanyl flows and cartel power would deprive Venezuela (and by extension Cuba/Russia) of one modus operandi for influence (the chaos and corruption spread by drug money). It would also bolster US standing as a security provider in LATAM, perhaps reassuring countries that Washington, not Beijing or Moscow, can best address regional crises. Already, the extradition of a top fentanyl trafficker and the slight dip in US overdose deaths in 2024 have been lauded as proof that coordinated action yields results. However, there are risks. If the US approach veers into unilateral military action (as some hawks urge, citing narco-terrorism), it could spark backlash akin to past interventions, playing into the hands of Cuba, China, and Russia, who would eagerly condemn US “imperialism” and rally regional opinion against Washington. Striking a balance is key: the US looks to strengthen alliances (like with Mexico and Colombia) to choke off drug routes, while diplomatically isolating Venezuela’s regime and its enablers. The coming years will test whether this strategy can stabilize LATAM’s drug economy without inflaming geopolitical tensions. One thing is clear: Venezuela’s crisis has become a linchpin issue at the crossroads of organized crime and great power rivalry. The outcome will significantly shape US influence and the security architecture of the Western Hemisphere for years to come
This analysis was prompted by recent reporting from Matthew Luxmoore at the Wall Street Journal, which highlighted how deeply military content has been integrated into Russian schools. I reviewed additional reporting, open-source research, Russian government documents, and independent analyses to understand the broader context.
Overview
Recent reporting by Matthew Luxmoore at the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) prompted a deeper look into how far the Kremlin has reshaped Russia’s education system for long-term militarization. His work highlights a trend that has accelerated significantly since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and after reviewing additional sources, the picture that emerges is sharper and more concerning than a single article can capture.
A Systematic Shift Since 2014
Russia’s patriotic education initiatives began expanding after the annexation of Crimea, but the scale shifted significantly following the 2022 invasion. Federal spending grew from roughly $40 million in 2021 to nearly $600 million by 2024, supporting curriculum rewrites, school-based training programs, and the proliferation of state-run youth organizations.
New standardized history and civics textbooks portray the US and NATO as direct threats and depict Ukraine as a Western proxy. Tactical training equipment and mock Kalashnikov rifles have been distributed to thousands of schools. In many regions, these activities are now compulsory, not extracurricular.
Youth participants in military training exercises, equipped with camouflage uniforms and training equipment, highlighting the integration of militarization in Russian education. Source: Jamestown
Education as a Mobilization Pipeline
The Defense Ministry’s Youth Army (Yunarmiya), established in 2016, now claims more than 1.8 million members. It operates as a nationwide cadet network that integrates students into military culture early and maintains engagement through adolescence.
Active-duty personnel increasingly teach in classrooms, leading instruction on weapons safety, basic first aid, drone operation fundamentals, and military discipline. By eighth grade, these courses resemble structured pre-conscription preparation. In occupied Ukrainian regions, Russia has imposed these same curricula while removing Ukrainian-language materials.
Map showing the assessed control of terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War as of November 14, 2025, highlighting significant fighting areas and territorial claims. Source: Institute for the Study of War
Strategic Messaging
The Kremlin frames these programs as tools for national unity and resilience. Critics inside Russia describe them as mechanisms for suppressing dissent and reducing independent thought. Teachers who resist implementation face administrative penalties or prosecution, underscoring the coercive nature of the effort.
While patriotism in Russian schools is not new, the current approach is more centralized, more compulsory, and more explicitly linked to real-world conflict. The expansion into early childhood (down to the first years of primary school) represents a significant change from previous decades.
Information Environment Pressures
A key driver appears to be the changing information landscape. Russian youth have greater exposure to Western media, global online discourse, and alternative political viewpoints than previous generations. Surveys consistently show that younger Russians are the least aligned with Kremlin narratives and the most likely to bypass state information controls.
This environment has prompted more aggressive ideological programming. Early-age indoctrination is used to establish state-approved narratives before outside information becomes accessible.
Implications for Future Confrontation
Taken together, these developments suggest deliberate social preparation for long-term geopolitical tension with the West. Russia is not only modernizing its armed forces; it is shaping future generations to accept sustained confrontation and large-scale mobilization as normal.
This generational strategy will influence Russia’s military posture, information operations, and cyber workforce for years to come. For the US and allied nations, it suggests a security environment where societal militarization becomes a persistent feature of Russia’s strategic behavior.
A recent Financial Times report revealed that the US has quietly provided intelligence support to enable Ukraine’s long-range strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, representing a significant evolution in the strategic landscape of the war. This isn’t just about Ukraine landing successful drone or missile strikes. It’s about deliberately going after the economic base that keeps Russia’s war machine running.
According to the reporting, US intelligence has played a central role in shaping Ukraine’s route planning, timing, and target prioritization. This has allowed Ukrainian forces to bypass layers of Russian air defense and strike energy assets far beyond the frontline. Over the last few months, at least 16 of Russia’s 38 oil refineries have been hit, disrupting more than one million barrels per day of refining capacity. These strikes have forced Moscow to cut diesel exports and rely more on imports, tightening supply chains across sectors vital to its economy and military.
Flames and smoke rise from a Russian oil refinery after a Ukrainian drone strike in October 2025, part of a US-backed campaign targeting energy infrastructure. Source: The Moscow Times
The operation points to a deliberate shift in US strategy. Rather than direct military engagement, the US appears to be enabling Ukraine to impose economic costs through precision strikes on energy infrastructure. These assets are crucial to financing and sustaining Russian military operations. By degrading this capacity, Ukraine is eroding the Kremlin’s ability to wage a prolonged war.
The timing is notable, too. The escalation in intelligence sharing reportedly followed a July conversation between President Donald Trump and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, signaling a change in Washington’s willingness to support deeper strikes. This is a departure from earlier caution, signaling a move toward indirect pressure on Moscow, as opposed to direct escalation.
The operational implications are just as significant. Ukraine has combined improved domestic drone production with high-quality targeting data to achieve strategic effects once reserved for major powers. This model of intelligence-enabled, long-range strikes highlights how modern warfare increasingly relies on precision, adaptability, and economic disruption rather than massed forces alone.
In the months ahead, Russia is likely to face mounting financial pressure as repeated strikes force expensive repairs, disrupt production cycles, and strain export revenue. Even if individual facilities recover, the cumulative effect of sustained targeting will weaken Moscow’s economic resilience. This campaign is designed to shift the balance through systemic pressure on the Kremlin’s capacity to sustain its war.
The KittenBusters repository publicly discloses internal materials tied to the Iranian APT known as Charming Kitten (IRGC-IO Counterintelligence Unit 1500). The disclosures include official documents, employee photos, malware samples, chat logs, attack reports, and translations, all intended as evidence of the group’s operations. The repo also names a purported leader (Abbas Rahrovi/Abbas Hosseini) associated with front companies, asserts the group has targeted telecoms, aviation, intelligence, and dissidents in the Middle East and beyond, and announces future releases of additional evidence.
Analysis: The release of these materials tied to Charming Kitten gives us a rare visibility into the structure, leadership, and tradecraft of an Iranian state-sponsored actor. If real, these disclosures are highly likely to aid defenders in attribution and detection, but they also risk prompting the group to adapt its operations and shift infrastructure. The exposure of individual operators and front companies could pressure Iran’s cyber apparatus, but it is likely Tehran will deny involvement while continuing on with other campaigns under modified units or identities. Should be a fun one to follow.
China Criticizes Canadian And Australian Warships Transiting Taiwan Strait – 6 SEPT 2025
Reuters (BEIJING) – Beijing criticized the passage of Canadian and Australian warships through the Taiwan Strait, framing the transit as provocation. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) monitored and issued warnings as the allied vessels conducted a routine passage, marking the first such join transit by Canberra and Ottawa. Source: (Reliability: Very High)
Analysis: It is likely that Beijing will intensify diplomatic protests and military shadowing in response to the growing number of allied transits, but it is unlikely that China will attempt direct interdiction in the near term, as escalation risks remain high. (Analytic Confidence: Moderate)
Comment: By joining the U.S. and U.K. in conducting Taiwan Strait passages, Australia and Canada add weight to a growing allied pattern by the West that makes it more difficult for Beijing to depict these operations as isolated provocations.
A Chinese Navy ship shadows HMAS Brisbane during a joint naval activity in the South China Sea, 3 September 2025. The Guardian
FBI Adapts Hunt Methods For Salt Typhoon And Volt Typhoon – 10 SEPT 2025
Cyberscoop (WASHINGTON) – Major intrusions into U.S. telecommunications groups and infrastructure by Chinese groups Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon have forced changes in FBI hunting tradecraft, reflecting persistence on critical networks and adaptation to stealthy techniques. An FBI official noted that the two groups have improved their tactics and methods . Source (Reliability: High)
Analysis: It is likely that People’s Republic of China (PRC) state actors will sustain cyber operations against critical U.S. and allied infrastructure, with campaign tempo increasing as Taiwan tensions escalate. (Analytic Confidence: Moderate)
Taiwan Minister Warns of ‘Domino Effect’ if China Takes Island – 12 SEPT 2025
Reuters (WASHINGTON) – Chiu Chui-cheng, head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, warned that China’s growing military activity and refusal to renounce force against Taiwan suggests that Beijing might be preparing for war. Chiu argues that if Taiwan were to fall, it could trigger a “domino effect” destabilizing the Asia-Pacific and directly threatening U.S. influence and security. Source: (Reliability: Very High)
Analysis: It is highly likely that Taiwan and its foreign partners will increase diplomatic and military signaling in response to China’s rhetoric, to deter further escalation. (Analytic Confidence: High)
Philippines Protests PRC “Nature Reserve” Plan At Scarborough Shoal – 12 SEPT 2025
The Diplomat (WASHINGTON) – Manila filed a diplomatic protest over Beijing’s plan to designate a nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal, warning it could serve as a pretext for occupation of the contested feature. Source: (Reliability: High)
Comment: Environmental framing has emerged as a recurring tool for Beijing to justify administrative control at disputed features while complicating counter-messaging by claimant states.
China’s Third Carrier Fujian Departs Shanghai; Detected Near Senkaku Islands – 13 SEPT 2025
The Diplomat (WASHINGTON) – The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) carrier Fujian departed Jiangnan Shipyard on 10 September 2025. Japan’s Joint Staff detected the Fujian and two destroyers roughly 200 km northwest of the Senkaku Islands, heading southwest. Source: (Reliability: High)
Analysis: It is highly likely that the PLAN intends to conduct Fujian’s first long-range trial deployment within weeks, signaling advancing carrier readiness and pressuring Japan’s near seas defense posture. (Analytic Confidence: High)
China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, in the East China Sea, 11 September 2025. Japanese Ministry of Defense
Military raids and high-profile arrests make headlines, but they do not end the business of cartels. Mexican and South American trafficking organizations operate like multinational corporations: diversified revenue streams, global supply chains, and deep local recruitment pipelines. Long-term disruption will require a different approach. The US must pursue strategies that make the cartel business model financially unsustainable and logistically difficult. This means combining proven tactics with fresh ideas.
The points below are presented as broad concepts to help spark discussion, rather than full write-ups. Bullet points allow the ideas to be absorbed quickly, keep the focus on the main themes, and give room for others to share their perspectives or expand on them with their own insights.
Hit the Money
Cartels are profit-driven, so hitting their finances directly is one of the most effective tactics.
Sanctions: Use the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act and related tools to freeze assets and bar cartel associates from the global financial system.
AML enforcement: Monitor wire transfers, front companies, trade-based laundering, and crypto flows.
Asset forfeiture: Seize properties, accounts, and equipment tied to trafficking.
Gatekeeper accountability: Extend AML requirements to lawyers, accountants, and company formation agents who unintentionally aid laundering.
Cartels are resilient because they operate across multiple domains: finance, logistics, community, and technology. Disrupting one area temporarily hurts them; attacking all at once can slowly erode their power. The US can combine financial sanctions, supply chain disruption, legal pressure, recruitment prevention, and intelligence innovation into a long-term strategy. Success will not be a single decisive victory, but a steady squeeze that makes cartel operations unprofitable and unsustainable.
In the wake of escalating tensions in the Middle East this past spring, Iranian state-sponsored hackers turned their focus toward a new frontier: US critical infrastructure.
From May through June 2025, cybersecurity telemetry revealed a 133% surge in Iran-attributed cyber activity targeting US industrial and operational technology (OT) environments. These campaigns hit transportation and manufacturing sectors, but energy and water infrastructure remain long-standing targets. While espionage remains a primary objective, the evidence increasingly suggests Iran is preparing for more overt disruption.
Strategic Escalation
Iran’s cyber posture has always mirrored its geopolitical environment. In Spring 2025, that meant responding to Israeli and US airstrikes with asymmetric cyber operations. Groups like APT33 (Elfin), APT34 (OilRig), and MuddyWater (Static Kitten) ramped up traditional espionage, while more aggressive actors like CyberAv3ngers and Fox Kitten (tied to recent Pay2Key.I2P ransomware operations) pursued OT-focused sabotage and ransomware deployment.
Iran’s messaging through pseudo-hacktivist fronts and deepening ties with ransomware operators clearly framed this activity as retaliation for “Western aggression.” That framing is part of a broader Iranian cyber doctrine that views critical infrastructure compromised as a form of coercion and deterrence.
In parallel with APT activity, pro-Iranian hacktivists ramped up operations against US defense and critical infrastructure sectors. Groups like “Mr. Hamza” claimed responsibility for defacing and leaking data tied to defense contractors, including Raytheon technologies (RTX), following US involvement in strikes against Iranian facilities. While attribution remains murky, these operations often mirror Iranian state objectives and timelines, suggesting coordination or at least ideological alignment. The targeting of US DIB entities serves Tehran’s broader goal of projecting reach and retaliation across both digital and strategic domains.
🚨 DDoS Alert 🚨
Mr Hamza claims to have targeted multiple websites
-RTX Corporation 🇺🇸 -Parsons Corporation 🇺🇸 -Kratos Defense and Security Solutions 🇺🇸 -CACI International Inc. 🇺🇸 -Ultra Group 🇬🇧 -Cobham 🇬🇧 -Serco Group plc 🇬🇧 -Elbit Systems 🇮🇱 -Israel Aerospace Industries 🇮🇱… pic.twitter.com/YGHB1tTPmt
Iran’s shift toward OT environments is the most significant development.
MuddyWater and APT33 continued to exfiltrate intellectual property from manufacturing and defense-adjacent industries.
CyberAv3ngers targeted water control systems and other ICS devices with their custom malware, IOControl, discovered embedded in US and allied OT environments.
Fox Kitten evolved into a ransomware-as-a-service operator with an 80% (up from 70%) profit-share for affiliates targeting the US or Israel.
Alongside collecting information, these actors are also establishing persistence. In many cases, backdoors were quietly planted and left dormant; signaling an intent for future activation should the need arise.
Actor
Affiliation
Focus
Objective
MuddyWater
MOIS
Aerospace & Defense, Utilities, Gov, Civil & NGOs
Espionage
APT33
IRGC
Aerospace & Defense, Energy, Gov, Healthcare
Espionage and Access
CyberAv3ngers
IRGC
Water, ICS, Finance
Disruption
Fox Kitten
Unkown
IT/OT Gateways
Ransomware-as-a-service
OilRig
MOIS
Finance, Gov
Credential Theft
Implications for the US DIB
Iran’s campaigns are displaying a willingness to target logistics, aerospace, and manufacturing suppliers that support US and Israeli defense sectors. The Defense Industrial Base (DIB) should expect more of this; not only from state-sponsored actors, but from criminal or hacktivist affiliates acting on behalf of Iran’s IRGC or MOIS cyber arms.
Some immediate implications:
DIB contractors should hunt for Iranian TTPs and malware like IOControl and DNSpionage.
OT segmentation, remote access policies, and endpoint hygiene are foundational.
Incident response (IR) planning must include scenario-based escalation modeling: what happens if the access Iran gains today becomes a wiper event tomorrow?
US Response: Shields Up
Initially, the federal response may have felt quieter than prior cyber alerts like those during the Ukraine conflict but the signals were still there.
On LinkedIn, Jen Easterly, former CISA Director, reactivated the Shields Up mantra within hours of US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Her post explicitly warned US critical infrastructure operators to expect:
Credential theft and phishing
ICS-specific malware
Wipers masquerading as ransomware
Propaganda-laced hacktivist campaigns
Easterly urged sectors to segment OT networks, patch internet-facing systems, enforce MFA, rehearse ICS isolation, and actively monitor ISAC channels.
The various critical infrastructure-related ISACs followed suit. And while no single campaign bannered over the response, the defense posture matched the moment.
Jen Easterly emphasizes the importance of cybersecurity vigilance for US critical infrastructure in response to recent Iranian cyber activities.
So What’s Next?
Iran’s recent activity represents a shift in focus, not necessarily a shift in capability. The targeting of OT environments and critical infrastructure may reflect aspirational doctrine as much as operational readiness. While there’s no conclusive evidence that Iranian actors have staged disruptive payloads in U.S. networks, the direction of their targeting and tooling, particularly the development of ICS and OT-specific malware, suggests a growing interest in operational disruption, and not just information gathering.
For the US defense and critical infrastructure communities, this creates a clear mandate to prepare for the next phase before it arrives.
Monitor beyond the perimeter: Iranian threat actors have historically gained access through default credentials, exposed devices, and lateral movements through flat networks.
Expect dual-use operations: Intelligence collection and pre-positioning are not mutually exclusive.
Reassess assumptions: Iranian groups are traditionally viewed as less sophisticated than Russian or Chinese APTs, but recent coordination and tooling suggest they’re evolving quickly.
In short, we’re seeing a doctrinal pivot. Iran is exploring offensive options in OT environments, and testing how far it can go without triggering escalation. This makes detection, attribution, and sector-wide coordination more important than ever.
This document is a strategic nonproliferation analysis modeled after the IAEA’s State Evaluation Report (SER) format. Developed as part of an academic project, it assesses a specific country’s nuclear capabilities, incentives for proliferation, and potential safeguards challenges. The goal is to simulate real-world intelligence analysis and offer policy-relevant insights on nuclear risk and verification needs.
Introduction
Turkey occupies a unique strategic position at the crossroads of Europe and the Middle East, neighboring several current or former weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-proliferating states. As a longstanding NATO member under the US nuclear umbrella, Turkey’s security has historically relied on alliance commitments, including the stationing of an estimated 50 US B61 nuclear bombs at Incirlik Air Base. At the same time, Turkey has pursued nuclear energy ambitions for several decades as part of its economic growth and energy security strategy. Turkey is a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State party in good standing under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has been public in its support of nonproliferation norms. Occasional remarks made by Turkey’s leadership, however, have raised concerns about its long-term intentions. This research paper will provide a comprehensive analysis of Turkey’s nuclear energy development. It will survey Turkey’s nuclear program and infrastructure, examine potential incentives and pathways for proliferation, identify indicators of any deviation from peaceful commitments, and review verification mechanisms. The goal is to synthesize current information and offer a policy-relevant assessment of the proliferation risks associated with Turkey, in line with international nonproliferation frameworks.
State Profile and Nuclear Program
Background and Nuclear History
Turkey’s interest in nuclear technology dates to the 1950s with plans for nuclear power formulated as early as 1970. During the Cold War, Turkey’s role as a NATO frontline state against the Soviet Union emphasized its strategic importance, but nuclear weapons were supplied by the US under NATO sharing agreements rather than developed internally. Turkey established the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) in 1982 to supervise nuclear research and development (R&D). In the following decades, Turkey made several attempts to launch nuclear power projects, but these early bids were canceled or delayed due to financial, regulatory, and political hurdles. It wasn’t until the 2010s that Turkey’s nuclear power ambitions gained some traction, showcasing a high-level political push to reduce heavy dependence on imported energy and to nurture economic growth.
Nuclear Facilities and Fuel Cycle
Turkey doesn’t yet operate any nuclear power reactors, but construction is underway. The country’s first nuclear power plant, at Akkuyu on the Mediterranean coast, is being built by Russian state-owned Rosatom under a build, own, operate (BOO) model. The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant will consist of four VVER-1200 pressurized water reactors (4,800 Mwe total) with construction beginning in 2018, and Unit 1 expected online in 2025, with the remaining units coming online through 2028. A second plant was planned at Sinop on the Black Sea coast in partnership with a French Japanese consortium, but a 2018 feasibility study deemed the project’s cost and schedule unfeasible under the original terms. Since then, Turkey has explored other potential partners for Sinop, including more talks with Russia in late-2022 to possibly construct four reactors there. A third site at Igneada has also been under discussion with Chinese firms offering to build reactors using US-derived technology.
Map highlighting key locations for Turkey’s nuclear power projects, including Akkuyu, Sinop, and Igneada.
Beyond power reactors, Turkey’s nuclear infrastructure includes research and training reactors. A small TRIGA Mark-II research reactor (250 kW) has operated at Istanbul Technical University (ITU) since 1979. Another research reactor, the 5 MW TR-2 at the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center near Istanbul, commissioned in 1981, was used for research and isotope production. The TR-2 originally ran on high-enriched uranium (HEU), but in 2009 was shut down to undergo conversion to low-enriched uranium (LEU) as part of nonproliferation efforts. The reactor’s HEU fuel was returned to the US in 2009, and Turkish authorities have since implemented safety upgrades; regulatory approval to restart TR-2 with LEU has been sought, with additional plans to resume operations to support research and isotope needs. These moves have eliminated weapons-grade HEU from Turkey, aligning with global minimization of civilian HEU. Aside from these reactors, Turkey doesn’t currently operate facilities for sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle processes like uranium enrichment or reprocessing, and it has no known capability to produce nuclear fuel indigenously. All fuel for future power reactors will be supplied through foreign partners (i.e., Rosatom for Akkuyu) under long-term contracts. The Akkuyu agreement includes a provision to establish a fuel fabrication plant in Turkey, which would enable local assembly of nuclear fuel, though the plant would still rely on important enriched uranium from Russia. Turkey has an estimated few thousand tonnes U of domestic uranium resources in central Anatolia; a modest supply. The Temrezli in-situ leach uranium mining project was explored by foreign firms, but the government revoked the licenses in 2018, stalling the project. In 2024, Turkey showed interest in securing uranium supply abroad, signing a cooperation pact with Niger to allow Turkish companies to explore Niger’s uranium mines. Turkish officials, including the foreign and energy ministers, visited Niger in mid-2024 seeking access to its high-grade uranium deposits. It’s these efforts that reflect Turkey’s desire to ensure fuel supply for its “nascent nuclear-power industry” and potentially to gain experience in the front end of the fuel cycle, though any moves toward indigenous enrichment remains a longer-term and scrutinized prospect (Sykes, P., Hoije, K., 2024).
Future Plans for Nuclear Energy
Looking forward, nuclear energy plays a central role in Turkish strategy to diversify its electricity mix and lessen dependence on imported natural gas and coal. The government’s current plans see three nuclear power plant sites in operation by the mid-20230s (Akkuyu, Sinop, and a third site) with a total of up to 12 reactor units (approx. 15 GWe capacity). As of December 2024, Akkuyu’s four units are under active construction with Rosatom financing and owning a majority stake. As for Sinop, Turkey has initially partnered with a Japanese French consortium (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Itochu, and EDF/Areva) to build ATMEA-1 reactors, but cost estimates ballooned (over $44 billion) leading to that consortium’s withdrawal in 2018. Turkey has since kept Sinop on the agenda, even courting Russia to take it over, but no final agreement has been reached. Meanwhile, China has emerged as a leading contender for the third Turkish plant with negotiations in mid-2023 involving Chinese state companies proposing to build reactors (possibly Hualong One designs) at Igneada in Thrace. A project like this might involve US-derived technology through China General Nuclear’s partnership with Western firms. The timeline for Sinop and Igneada projects remains uncertain as both depend on financing terms, technology selection, and Turkish political will to commit further resources. Still, President Erdogan has repeatedly affirmed Turkey’s intent to become a nuclear energy country, even stating an ambition for “three nuclear power plants by 2030” in public remarks. To build the necessary human capital, Turkey has sent forth hundreds of students abroad for nuclear engineering education. Since 2011, Rosatom has sponsored Turkish students at Russian universities to staff Akkuyu; as of 2025, dozens of Turkish graduates have earned nuclear engineering degrees in Russia and returned to work at the plant. Similar training initiatives exist with other partner countries, creating a pipeline of skilled personnel. While aimed at peaceful energy development, this growing base of nuclear expertise and infrastructure provides capabilities that could, under different political circumstances, be relevant to a weapons program. Later in the paper I will expand on dual use.
Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant: Turkey’s first and advanced nuclear facility, demonstrating the nation’s commitment to energy diversification and security.
Nuclear Regulatory Framework
Turkey has recently overhauled its nuclear regulatory system to meet international standards as it works through nuclear power. Historically, the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) functioned as both a promoter and regulator of nuclear activities. In July 2018, Turkey created an independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority, or Nukleer Duzenleme Kurumu (NDK), transferring most of TAEK’s regulatory and licensing duties to this new body. The NDK regulates nuclear power plant safety, security, and all fuel cycle-related activities, issuing licenses and conducting inspections in line with IAEA guidelines. TAEK’s role was reduced to managing radioactive waste and decommissioning issues, and in 2020 TAEK was further consolidated into the Turkey Energy, Nuclear and Mining Research Institute (TENMAK). TENMAK now acts as the national R&D organization for nuclear science, energy, and mineral resources, inheriting TAEK’s research institutes. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), chaired by a high-level official, oversees all nuclear activities and advises the government on policy. Some other relevant bodies include the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (which sets energy policy) and the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA), which handles electricity market licensing and would approve electric generation licenses for nuclear plants. Turkey has also updated its nuclear liability and safety laws in line with international conventions, being a signatory of the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability for nuclear damage. Regarding nuclear security, Turkey has welcomed international peer reviews. The IAEA conducted International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions in 2003 and 2021, which reviewed Turkey’s nuclear security regime. The 2021 mission noted Turkey’s adherence to IAEA nuclear security guidance and incorporation of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which Turkey ratified in 2015. Overall, Turkey’s regulatory framework is being strengthened to support the safe expansion of nuclear energy, with clear separation of promotion (TENMAK) and regulation (NDK) functions as per international best practices. The framework provides the basis for ensuring that Turkey’s nuclear activities stay under effective control and exclusively peaceful.
Nonproliferation Treaty Obligations and International Commitments
Turkey has a long-standing commitment to global nonproliferation regimes. It became a party to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1979 and implemented a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1981. Under these safeguards, all nuclear material and facilities in Turkey are subject to IAEA monitoring to verify they are not used for weapons. Turkey was an early adopter of the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP), signing it in 2000 and putting it into effect in 2001. The AP grants the IAEA expanded rights of access and information, allowing for inspections of undeclared sites and verification of the absence of clandestine nuclear operations. Turkey’s implementation of the AP has allowed the IAEA to reach a broader conclusion since 2012 that Turkey has no undeclared nuclear material activities present. This provides confidence in Turkey’s compliance with its nonproliferation obligations. In addition to the NPT, Turkey also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, pledging not to conduct nuclear explosion tests. Turkey is also a party to international initiatives aimed at preventing WMD proliferation. It has been a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) since 2000, and of the Zangger Committee since the 1990s. These memberships commit Turkey to implement strict controls on exports of nuclear and dual-use materials, making sure they are not diverted to weapons programs. Likewise, Turkey joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1997 to curb the spread of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMDs. As a chemical weapons possessor in the past, Turkey signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and completed the destruction of its limited chemical stockpile, and it adheres to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) while no known biological programs exist in the country. Maybe most importantly, Turkey, like all UN member states, is bound by UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires national laws to prevent non-state actors from acquiring NBC weapons. Turkey had welcomed Resolution 1540 and submitted multiple national reports on its implementation, detailing measures such as export controls, border security, and criminalization of proliferation activities. Although Turkey is not a member of any formal nuclear-weapon-free zone, it has voiced support in international forums for the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Turkey’s stance has been that all countries in its region (including Israel and Iran) should forego WMD, aligning with its broader advocacy for disarmament and a fair nonproliferation regime.
To summarize, Turkey’s official posture is firmly embedded in the global nonproliferation regime: it has comprehensive IAEA safeguards and an Additional Protocol in force, and it participates in all major export control and nonproliferation initiatives. These obligations form a strong legal barrier to diversion of its booming nuclear energy program for non-peaceful uses. However, in the next section we will look at regional security context and Turkey’s evolving strategic calculus could, under some conditions, create incentives to reconsider these commitments.
Proliferation Pathways
Strategic Incentives for Nuclear Weapons
Under existing conditions, Turkey does not actively seek nuclear weapons. That said, analysts have identified several scenarios in which Turkey’s incentives could shift toward proliferation. The most cited trigger is a nuclear-armed Iran. Turkey and Iran are regional rivals balancing each other’s influence; if Iran were to openly acquire nuclear weapons or become a threshold nuclear state, Turkey could feel a heightened security threat and pressure to respond accordingly. The prospect of a nuclear Iran has already spurred debates in Turkey’s strategic community about Turkey’s vulnerability and the reliability of external protection. While NATOs nuclear umbrella currently covers Turkey, President Erdogan has voiced doubts about its long-term credibility, questioning whether it is acceptable that others are free to have nuclear-tipped missiles while Turkey cannot. This sentiment suggests a perceived inequity in the nonproliferation order and a desire for greater strategic autonomy. If Turkey’s confidence in NATO security guarantees diminishes, their leaders might reassess the costs and benefits of an independent deterrent. Calls to remove US nuclear weapons from Incirlik have increased in recent years. If those weapons were removed without an adequate alternative security arrangement, Turkey could perceive a deterrence gap.
Regional dynamics beyond Iran also play into Turkey’s strategic calculus. Turkey borders Syria and is in proximity to Israel; one a former proliferation and the other an undeclared nuclear state. Erdogan has rhetorically pointed to Israel’s nuclear arsenal as an unfair threat in the region, although Israel’s weapons have existed for decades and are likely not the primary driver for Turkey today. More relevant are Turkey’s great-power neighbors: Russia’s aggressive posturing in Ukraine and Syria and its nuclear saber-rattling unsettle the security environment. Although Russia is a partner of Turkey’s energy projects, their geopolitical interests diverge in places like Syria, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea. A nuclear capability could be seen by some Turkish strategists as an equalizer to deter a nuclear-armed Russia or to assert Turkey’s leadership in a multipolar Middle East. Additionally, domestic and prestige factors could serve as incentives. Under Erdogan’s administration, Turkey as embraces a narrative of “New Turkey” and neo-Ottoman strategic independence. Possessing advanced technology or even nuclear weapons can be viewed as a status symbol of great power. Some proliferation theories suggest countries may pursue nuclear weapons partly to bolster national pride or international standing. Erdogan’s 2019 statement, “there is no developed nation in the world that doesn’t have them”, shows a misconception but also possibly a prestige-driven itch: he compared nuclear armament with being a developed, powerful nation, implying Turkey should not be left behind. Domestically, pursuing nuclear weapons might rally nationalist support by asserting Turkey’s sovereignty against Western double standards, although it would conflict with Turkey’s international commitments and likely invite sanctions or isolation that most Turkish citizens would deem unacceptable.
In weighing these incentives, it is important to note that Turkey’s powerful military and bureaucratic establishment have historically prioritized alignment with NATO and adherence to the NPT. For decades now, the Turkish General Staff and diplomats were staunch defenders of nonproliferation, partly to maintain NATO cohesion and EU accession prospects. Turkey’s civil-military balance, however, has shifted under Erdogan, with civilian nationalist and assertive leadership consolidating control. If the political leadership decided a nuclear deterrent was necessary for national survival or prestige, domestic opposition from the traditional secular elite or military might not be as decisive a constraint as in the past. Still, any such decision would be fraught with risk, potentially jeopardizing Turkey’s security ties and economy. Most analysts assess Turkey is unlikely to go nuclear unless the strategic environment changes drastically; for example, if Iran openly crosses the nuclear threshold or the NATO security guarantee erodes beyond repair. Even in those cases, Turkey may first pursue middle options like developing latent capability or a civilian fuel cycle that hedges toward weapons before outright weaponization.
Potential Proliferation Pathways
If Turkey were to seek nuclear weapons, how could it technically proceed given its current capabilities and constraints? One pathway could be the uranium enrichment route. Turkey has significant experience with nuclear materials at the reactor level but currently lacks enrichment facilities. However, Turkey has consistently asserted its “right to enrich” under the NPT for peaceful purposes. In a proliferation scenario, Turkey may invoke an energy security rationale to establish an indigenous uranium enrichment program seemingly to fuel future power reactors. This could begin overtly as a small pilot enrichment facility under safeguards. An indicator of such intent was Turkey’s pursuit of raw uranium sources like Niger. Acquiring uranium ore is only logical if you plan to fabricate fuel or enrich it domestically rather than relying on foreign supply. A suspiciously timed deal for large quantities of uranium or the import of enrichment-related technology would set off alarms. Were Turkey to secretly acquire or build centrifuges, it might leverage foreign expertise. There is historical precent for illicit procurement networks using Turkey as a transit point. An example would be components for Pakistan’s AQ Khan network passed through Turkish companies in the early 2000s. Turkey could potentially seek external assistance for a weapons effort from allies like Pakistan, which has an established nuclear arsenal. Speculation exists that Pakistan and Turkey, sharing strong defense ties, may cooperate if Turkey decided to proliferate. There is currently no public evidence of any Pakistani commitment to aid a Turkish nuclear weapons program, and Pakistan would face intense international backlash if it openly transferred such technology. More likely, Turkey may try to indigenously develop the pieces of a fuel cycle. For example, this could include a covert centrifuge R&D project hidden within its civil nuclear research institutes. Turkey’s well-educated nuclear engineers could form the backbone of a secret program, though designing efficient centrifuges or obtaining high-strength materials in secret would be a significant challenge under trade surveillance.
Another pathway is the plutonium route, but this appears less practical for Turkey. Turkey’s power reactors at Akkuyu are light-water reactors under IAEA safeguards. Any diversion of spent fuel for plutonium reprocessing would likely be detected, and Turkey lacks a reprocessing plant. The acquisition or construction of a clandestine reprocessing facility would be tough to conceal. Turkey also has no heavy water reactors which produce bomb-suitable plutonium more efficiently; if it suddenly announced plans for a research reactor of the type that could yield significant plutonium, that would raise red flags. A theoretical scenario could involve Turkey repurposing its research reactor activities: for example, producing small quantities of plutonium in the TR-2 reactor’s fuel, which is now LEU, not ideal for weapons-grade plutonium production, and the reactor is small. This is an unlikely route given safeguards scrutiny and low output. A more dramatic approach would be for Turkey to obtain a complete weapon or some fissile material from outside the country. While not likely, I cannot entirely dismiss scenarios like stealing or seizing the US B61 bombs at Incirlik in a crisis. Those bombs, however, are under US control with Permissive Action Links and would be rendered unusable if seized; such actions would also damage US-Turkey relations and bring about global censure. Alternatively, Turkey could try to buy a weapon or fissile material on the black market. This, too, is remote given today’s monitoring and the lack of any known willing seller aside from North Korea, which Turkey would be extremely unlikely to engage.
A more subtle proliferation strategy for Turkey might by a nuclear hedge; developing nuclear latency without overt weaponization. This could involve the buildup of all components short of the bomb. These components could be a domestic enrichment capability, a stockpile of LEU, advances in missile delivery systems, and even civil nuclear naval propulsion research which could act as a loophole to withdraw material from safeguards as it uses highly enriched fuel. Turkey has already been building up its ballistic missile program, including the production of the Bora-1 (280km short-range ballistic missile (SRBM)), testing of the Tayfun missile (over 500km) in 2022, and plans to extend this to 1,000 km. While officially for conventional deterrence, such longer-range missiles could be adapted to deliver nuclear warheads in the future. Turkey’s pathway to a bomb, if it ever chose to pursue one, would likely begin with leveraging its civil nuclear program to acquire enrichment technology under seemingly legal pretenses, or less likely, turning to covert external procurement. Each path faces significant technical and political obstacles and would probably be detected before yielding a proper weapon. I will expand on this further in the next section.
Official animation depicting Turkish Bora-1 ballistic missile being fired from a mobile launcher.
Indicators and Verification Mechanisms
With Turkey’s extensive treaty commitments, any move toward nuclear weapons development would generate observable indicators detectable by international monitors or intelligence. Potential indicators of deviation from peaceful use include both changes in policy behavior and technical anomalies:
Policy and legal indicators: An obvious indicator would be if Turkey’s government openly signaled intent to leave or undermine its nonproliferation obligations. For example, withdrawing from the NPT or the IAEA Safeguards Agreement would be an unmistakable warning and an escalatory step. Short of withdrawal, Turkey could cease implementation of the AP or refuse IAEA inspections that it previously accepted, on grounds of sovereignty or reciprocity. Such behavior would strongly suggest clandestine activity. Heightened nationalist rhetoric, like repeated presidential statements about the right to nuclear weapons or hints that Turkey might need its own deterrent if regional threats grow, would reinforce concerns. While Erdogan’s past remarks were one instance, a continuing pattern of such statements or inclusion of nuclear options in doctrinal discussions would indicate a policy shift.
Undeclared facilities and/or activities: On the more technical side, the emergence of any undeclared nuclear facility would be a red flag. Under the AP, Turkey must declare any new nuclear-related site. Discovery (through satellite imagery or other intelligence gathering methods) of a suspicious installation could indicate a secret enrichment plant. Additionally, construction of unusual scientific facilities like a heavy water production plant or a large radiochemistry lab that could handle plutonium with no clear civilian justification would raise alarms. Turkey’s extensive territory and tunneling expertise mean a covert site is not impossible, but it would be challenging to operate such a facility without detection in the long term, given overhead surveillance and the need to procure specialized equipment internationally. Analysts would scrutinize high-resolution satellite images for telltale signs such as security perimeters, ventilation stacks, waste streams at research sites, etc.
Procurement anomalies: A more subtle sign of proliferation intent could be illicit procurement. If Turkish entities start seeking unusual dual-use materials or technology inconsistent with their known civilian programs, this would be a key indicator. Examples could include attempts to purchase high strength maraging steel, frequency converters, vacuum pumps, or ring magnets suitable for gas centrifuges, outside of normal channels. Turkey’s membership in NSG means it has pledged export controls, but procuring imports for itself may involve covert channels.
Scientific and technical publications: Clues often emerge from the scientific community. If Turkish nuclear scientists begin publishing research on enrichment techniques, laser isotope separation, high-temperature plutonium chemistry, or warhead design physics, it might indicate state encouragement of expertise in weapons-relevant areas. Open-source analysts monitor publications and patent filings for such patterns. A historical parallel is how Iranian scientists’ papers on neutron initiators and uranium metallurgy were early giveaways of weapons-relevant R&D. For Turkey, any sudden surge in advanced nuclear fuel cycle research beyond what is needed for power reactor operation would be notable. The Turkish government’s tight control over research institutions might limit open publishing, but international collaborations or conference presentations could inadvertently reveal new focus areas.
Other behavioral signs: Turkey might seek to harden or diversify its delivery systems as a precursor. Testing of longer-range missiles or developing indigenous satellite launch vehicles could be dual-use for nuclear delivery. Turkey’s pursuit of air and missile defense could also be seen as an effort to protect against Israel/Iran missiles in a world where nuclear deterrence factors in. While not a concrete indicator of proliferation, a heavy emphasis on ballistic missile capability combined with nuclear rhetoric would deepen suspicion.
To detect and respond to these indicators, the international community relies on a suite of verification systems and monitoring approaches. These include:
IAEA safeguards and the AP: If Turkey remains under its current agreements, the IAEA is the first line of defense. The IAEA conducts regular inspections at declared facilities to verify that no nuclear material is diverted. Inventory checks and surveillance ensure that all enriched uranium and spent fuel is accounted for. Under the AP, the IAEA can request complementary access to any site, even non-nuclear sites, to investigate indications of nuclear related activities. As an example, inspectors can visit a university lab or industrial facility on short notice if they suspect nuclear material might be present. They may also carry out environmental sampling, swiping surfaces and air for traces of nuclear isotopes that might indicate clandestine work. Turkey’s broad cooperation has so far meant the IAEA has not reported any irregularities. If evidence arose, like foreign intelligence tips about a hidden lab, the IAEA could invoke a special inspection to clarify the situation, though this requires Board of Governors approval if the state resists.
National and allied intelligence: NATO allies, particularly the US, maintain intelligence efforts regarding Turkey’s strategic programs. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) could pick up conversations or orders related to secret nuclear activities. For example, communication with foreign suppliers about sensitive equipment or unusual military orders to prepare tunnels could be intercepted. Throughout the Iranian nuclear crisis, Western intelligence often uncovered facilities before the IAEA was informed. A similar watch on Turkey would likely reveal early moves toward weaponization. Turkey’s integration in Western defense networks might make covert activities harder to hide from its allies. If such intel were obtained, allies would most likely approach Turkey privately at first, and if concerns continued, raise the issue at the IAEA Board or UN Security Council.
Open-source and non-governmental monitoring: In today’s information age, independent researchers and NGOs play an important role. High-resolution commercial satellite imagery is readily available; think tanks like the Institute for Science and International Security or Turkey’s own EDAM could analyze new construction. If a large building pops up at the Kucukcekmece Nuclear Research Center, for example, with no declared purpose, analysts will likely flag it. Turkey’s media and academia may also leak information if scientists are reassigned to secret projects or if there’s an unexplained budget surge for a strategic program. Despite political pressures, Turkey maintains a varied press environment where some investigative journalists continue to pursue sensitive military stories, unless national security laws silence them.
International legal systems: If clear evidence of a proliferation attempt emerged, the issue would likely escalate to the UN Security Council (USNC) to authorize stronger verification or enforcement. The IAEA could refer Turkey to the UNSC for non-compliance, as it did with Iran in 2006, if Turkey were found breaching safeguards. The UNSC could then mandate more aggressive inspections or demand Turkey halt certain activities. In extreme cases, sanctions could be imposed to dissuade further progress. One tool could be a bespoke monitoring mechanism like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) model used for Iran, involving extensive verification beyond the AP like continuous monitoring of centrifuge production. Reaching that stage, however, would indicate a severe breakdown of trust. Before it escalates that far, Turkey’s partners would likely exercise diplomatic pressure and offer incentives to keep Turkey within the nonproliferation fold.
There have been no signs to date that Turkey has undertaken any covert nuclear weapons-related work. The IAEA has continuously drawn the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Turkey remains in peaceful use. Turkish transparency reinforces confidence in its compliance. That said, maintaining vigilance is prudent. The verification systems described ensure that if Turkey did ever pivot toward proliferation, it would most certainly face early detection and international intervention long before actual weaponization. This alone serves as a strong deterrent against any covert programs.
Conclusion
Turkey’s nuclear trajectory truly epitomizes the dual-use dilemma at the core of the nonproliferation regime where a country is pursuing a legitimate nuclear energy program while navigating a volatile security environment and harboring great power aspirations. My analysis finds that Turkey’s proliferation risk, at present, remains low as the country is deeply embedded in treaties like the NPT and relies on NATO security guarantees, giving it strong incentives to abstain from nuclear weapons. Turkey’s nuclear energy program is under strict international oversight, and recent steps show its commitment to purely peaceful use. Turkey’s unique regional posture, however, means its strategic calculus may change if the balance erodes. President Erdogan’s hits at the unfairness of the current order seems to suggest that Turkish restraint should not be taken for granted if proliferation cascades begin in the region.
From a policy perspective, a few measures can aid in keeping Turkey’s proliferation risk in check. First, sustaining NATOs assurances to Turkey is important since clear commitments and missile defense cooperation can mitigate the country’s security fears that might otherwise spur a nuclear option. The continued presence of NATO nuclear sharing serves as a material reminder that Turkey is protected, and allies should quietly engage Ankara on the role these weapons play and conditions under which their removal would be considered. Second, the international community should support Turkey’s civil nuclear program in such a way that minimizes proliferation-prone capabilities. This can include offering fuel supply guarantees, so Turkey feels no need to enrich uranium, and assisting with spent fuel management. Negotiating a fuel take-back agreement for Akkuyu’s spent fuel, for example, would remove stockpiles of plutonium-bearing material from Turkey. Additionally, encouraging Turkey to source fuel through multilateral frameworks or international fuel banks would reinforce the norm against national enrichment.
Third, robust diplomacy with Turkey regarding regional threats can address the root motivators. If Iran’s nuclear impasse worsens, involving Turkey in solutions will be important so that Turkey feels its security concerns are heard and managed collectively rather than having to fend for itself. Turkey has, in the past, played a role in diplomatic efforts, for instance, the 2010 Tehran fuel swap initiative with Brazil. Reintegrating Turkey as a constructive partner in nonproliferation initiatives, rather than a potential adversary, is the smarter play. Domestically, Turkey could be encouraged to continue demonstrating leadership in nonproliferation by ratifying the CTBT and actively participating in proposals for a Middle East WMD-Free Zone. These steps would bolster Turkey’s international image as a responsible stakeholder, countering any domestic narrative that might favor a weapons path.
Finally, the international community needs to maintain vigilant monitoring of Turkish nuclear activities, but in such a way as not to alienate or unjustly accuse. The existing verification tools are adequate, but should Turkey’s behavior change, then preemptive diplomacy is needed to address issues before mistrust spirals out of control. Open lines of communication between Turkish authorities and the IAEA will help clarify any technical questions, like informing the IAEA of any new nuclear research projects under AP declarations to avoid misconceptions.
To conclude, Turkey today presents a low proliferation risk and in many ways is a model of a non-nuclear-weapons state investing in nuclear power under proper safeguards. Its domestic regulatory reforms and international cooperation on nuclear security are positive indicators. The risk profile is not static, and it depends on geopolitical developments. The evolution of Iran’s nuclear program, the status of Turkey’s relations with the West, and the internal political shifts will all affect Turkey’s strategic choices. Proliferation in Turkey is not inevitable, nor is it likely in the near term, but it is conditional. By understanding those conditions and reinforcing the barriers, the international community can ensure that Turkey continues to find that the benefits of nonproliferation outweigh any perceived gains of developing a nuclear weapon. Keeping Turkey within the nonproliferation regime strengthens regional stability and upholds the integrity of a global norm that, as President Erdogan himself argued at the UN, should apply equally to all. In the end, Turkey’s case displays the importance of addressing the security and prestige concerns that drive proliferation, thereby preserving its role as a responsible actor in the pursuit of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
Jewell, J., & Ates, S. A. (n.d.). Introducing nuclear power in Turkey: A historic state strategy and future prospects. Energy Strategy Reviews. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2015.03.002
U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2005). Nuclear nonproliferation: IAEA has strengthened its safeguards and nuclear security programs, but weaknesses need to be addressed (GAO-06-93). https://www.gao.gov/assets/a248101.html
On 13 June 2025, Israel launched a surprise air offensive against Iran, bombing a series of nuclear and military installations after alleging Tehran was on the verge of nuclear weapons capability. Over the next week, intense exchanges ensued: Iran’s IRGC retaliated with hundreds of rockets and drones targeting Israeli cities, while skirmishes flared across Syria and Lebanon via Iran-aligned militias. The conflict escalated dramatically on 21 June 2025 when US President Donald Trump announced Operation Midnight Hammer, a US air and missile strike against three of Iran’s most critical nuclear facilities. All three sites (Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan) were integral to Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle and their selection was evidence of a sweeping effort to cripple Iran’s ability to produce weapons-grade material.
Notably, both Fordow and Natanz were under IAEA safeguards at the time of the strikes, meaning they were monitored with cameras, periodic inspections, and seals under the terms of Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. While these facilities had enriched uranium up to 60%, they remained within the bounds of Iran’s NPT obligations, though deeply controversial.
Iran’s immediate response was militarily limited but symbolically charged. In the early hours of 23 June Tehran fired a volley of ballistic missiles at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the largest U.S. base in the Gulf. The attack was preceded by advance warning and ultimately caused no casualties, a fact President Trump pointed to in calling Iran’s response “weak”. Nevertheless, the message was clear: Iran meant to show it could strike American assets in the region. Simultaneously, Iran’s parliament convened an emergency session in which hardline lawmakers voted to authorize closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a move that, if implemented, would choke off 1/5 of global oil shipments. This vote was largely posturing but it demonstrated Iran’s leverage over global energy markets and signaled how far it might go if fighting continued.
By 24 June, intensive behind-the-scenes diplomacy, reportedly involving Oman, Russia, and China, yielded a fragile ceasefire. President Trump announced that Israel and Iran had agreed to pause hostilities, with Israel phasing out airstrikes and Iran halting missile fire. Israeli warplanes stood down later that day, ending ten days of open warfare. The truce, however, remained shaky. Within hours of the ceasefire taking effect, Iranian proxies in Gaza and Lebanon launched isolated rocket salvos, and an Iranian missile strike landed in the Israeli city of Beersheba, causing civilian casualties.
For Iran, the outcome was bittersweet. On one hand, they survived the most concerted US-Israeli military action against it in decades; Iran’s leadership even declared victory once the ceasefire held, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei boasting that Iran had “slapped the US in the face” by resisting its demands. On the other hand, the physical damage to Iran’s nuclear program was significant. Post-strike satellite imagery showed heavily damaged buildings at Natanz and Fordow, and Western intelligence assessed that Iran’s enrichment capability had been set back by at least a year or two. US officials characterized the strikes as successful in destroying key infrastructure, while also emphasizing that no strike can destroy the knowledge in Iranian scientists’ heads. As the dust settled, Washington dispatched envoys to rally international support for stricter containment of Iran’s nuclear activities, even as Tehran dug in on its right to peaceful nuclear technology. This set the stage for the strategic implications now unfolding in the region, particularly regarding China’s role and the reactions of Iran’s regional rivals.
Strategic Insights
The US strikes jeopardize China’s investments in Iran and undercut Beijing’s role as regional mediator. While China condemned the attacks, it continues backing Iran economically an diplomatically. Beijing is expected to avoid direct confrontation while reinforcing ties to Tehran via energy trade, technology transfer, and coordinated diplomatic resistance to US pressure.
Satellite image depicting damage to Iran’s nuclear facility following recent US airstrikes.
Iran’s nuclear know-how and stockpiles remain intact despite facility damage. If Tehran resumes covert nuclear work, regional rivals like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt may accelerate nuclear “hedging” via civilian programs and dual-use technologies. The strikes risk triggering a latent arms race.
Attacking safeguarding facilities raises global legal and strategic concerns. Iran could reduce IAEA cooperation or even withdraw from the NPT. Regional states now question the value of treaty compliance if it doesn’t shield them from military action.
The crisis pulls Beijing and Moscow closer to Tehran. Both shielded Iran at the IAEA and could deepen covert cooperation in military tech and trade. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ambitions in the region are now tethered to Iran’s resilience and regional stability.
A detailed map illustrating China’s Belt and Road Initiative, showcasing the global infrastructure network involving railroads, ports, and pipelines.
The strikes boost US-Israel deterrence credibility in the short term, but also embolden Iran’s asymmetric response (ie proxy militias, cyber threats, and maritime disruptions). Gulf states remain diplomatically cautious but are reinforcing ties with U.S. defense structures
Watchlist: Things to Monitor
Indicator
What It Signals
Iran reduces IAEA access (ie expels inspectors or disables cameras)
A move toward clandestine nuclear activity or NPT withdrawal
Saudi or Turkish announcements on enrichment or reactor projects
Strategic hedging or quiet proliferation intent
Chinese tech transfers or sanctions-evasion trade with Iran
Strengthened Iran-China alignment despite Western pressure
Strait of Hormuz naval activity or proxy mobilization
Iranian asymmetric retaliation and escalation risk
Gulf states request new US air/missile defense assets
Deepening military alignment amid regional insecurity
Analyst Comment
From an intelligence perspective, the June 2025 Iran strikes represent a watershed that will reverberate through Middle East geopolitics in the short and mid term. The operation achieved a tactical objective in damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but it also unleashed a cascade of second-order effects. Chief among them is a likely redoubling of Iran’s determination to obtain a credible deterrent, nuclear or otherwise, to guard against regime-threatening strikes in the future. In turn, this is catalyzing reactions among Iran’s rivals to hedge their bets, potentially ushering the region into a new phase of latent proliferation.
The role of great powers has been pretty illuminating. China’s response, in particular, shows the primacy of interests over ideology in its foreign policy. Beijing’s vocal condemnation of US aggression was expected, but more telling is what China does next. So far, China appears committed to quietly propping up Iran’s economy and defense industrial base to ensure Tehran remains a thorn in Washington’s side and a viable participant in China’s Eurasian economic plans while carefully avoiding overt confrontation with the US or alienation of the Gulf states. This dual-track approach will test China’s diplomatic agility and will be a turning point in its Middle East footprint. Either China will emerge as a more assertive power brokering outcomes in regional conflicts, or it will retreat to the sidelines if costs outweigh gains. Early indicators (evacuation of Chinese nationals and calls for talks) seem to suggest a preference for limiting exposure, but Beijing is certainly learning from this crisis and will adjust its long-term strategy (for example, accelerating efforts to settle oil trades in yuan to reduce vulnerability to US sanctions pressure, as hinted by its increased use of RMB in dealings with Iran).
For the United States and its allies, the near-term requirement is to manage escalation and prevent Iran’s retaliation from sparking a broader war. This will mean hardening bases, improving regional early warning systems and processes, and coordinating closely with partners on contingency responses. Diplomatically, it will be imperative to capitalize on the leverage gained over Iran. If Iran is more isolated or its program set back, now is the time to negotiate firmer limits or at least interim arrangements to remove the most dangerous materials from its soil. The US Special Envoy has already signaled openness to talks focusing on Iran’s enrichment levels and stockpile, which would be a face-saving way for Iran to step back from the nuclear brink in exchange for sanctions relief once it regroups. Whether Iran’s leadership feeling humiliated is willing to engage is uncertain, but the ceasefire offers a narrow window for diplomacy before hardliners on all sides gain the upper hand.
A final note on non-proliferation: the integrity of the global regime is arguably at its most vulnerable point since the North Korean withdrawals of the early 2000s. If the Middle East heads into a proliferation cascade, the credibility of the NPT will suffer worldwide. To counter this, innovative solutions should be pursued. These would include a US-led initiative for a Middle East security guarantee (a nuclear umbrella covering Israel and key Arab states to negate their need for independent arsenals), or a rejuvenated push for regional disarmament talks that include Israel’s capabilities, a topic long taboo but maybe less so in the face of multiple potential nuclear actors emerging.
For intelligence terms, we will be watching for the morning after indicators: Does Iran move materiel to secret sites? Do Saudi Arabia or Turkey suddenly announce new “research” reactors or mining projects? Do China and Russia sign new defense deals with Iran? Each of these will tell us how far the dominoes could fall. As of now, the short-term implications are clear: heightened tensions, hedging, and alignment shifts. The mid-term implications, whether this results in a fundamentally more nuclearized and polarized Middle East, or a sobered return to the negotiating table, will depend on the deftness of diplomacy in the weeks ahead and the willingness of regional actors to step back from the precipice.
Stay tuned for more in-depth analysis on Chinese strategic influence in the Middle East, regional nuclear hedging, diplomatic alignments, and regional deterrence dynamics in a writeup to come.
![[Case Study] Turkey’s Nuclear Energy Development Proliferation Risk Profile](https://sploited.blog/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/an-intelligence-briefing-graphic-showing-satellite-imagery-of-nuclear-fuel-3.png?w=1024)
The Security Brief 